This paper studies how the degree of contract enforcement in a country influences firms’ financing decisions. We first document empirical facts on debt financing for two new firm-level datasets in the United Kingdom and Ecuador. In the United Kingdom, small firms borrow more relative to their assets than large firms, whereas in Ecuador small firms borrow less. We build a dynamic model of firms’ debt financing where debt is constrained by the likelihood of default, which varies across firms and economies with different degrees of enforcement. Because of their low firm values, small firms are mostly affected by abundance or scarcity of economy-wide loans generated by weak or strong contract enforcement. We calibrate our model to the datasets in the two countries and find that our mechanism can quantitatively account for the patterns observed in the data.
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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis in its series Staff Report with number
392.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Thomas F. Cooley & Vincenzo Quadrini, 1999.
"Financial Markets and Firm Dynamics,"
Working Papers
99-14, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
John Y. Campbell & Jens Hilscher & Jan Szilagyi, 2006.
"In Search of Distress Risk,"
NBER Working Papers
12362, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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