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Limited enforcement and the organization of production

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Quintin, Erwan

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Abstract

This paper describes a dynamic, general equilibrium model designed to gauge the importance of contractual imperfections in the form of limited enforcement for international differences in the organization of production. In the model, limited enforcement constrains agents to operate establishments below their optimal scale. As a result, economies where contracts are enforced more efficiently tend to be richer and emphasize large scale production. Calibrated simulations of the model reveal that these effects can be large and account for a sizeable part of the observed differences in the size distribution of manufacturing establishments between the United States, Mexico and Argentina.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6X4M-4PKFH0M-4/2/07aea25e31ac095b1c06011feb150f3e
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Macroeconomics.

Volume (Year): 30 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 1222-1245
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jmacro:v:30:y:2008:i:3:p:1222-1245

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622617

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. James R. Tybout, 2000. "Manufacturing Firms in Developing Countries: How Well Do They Do, and Why?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 11-44, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Marcet, Albert & Marimon, Ramon, 1992. "Communication, commitment, and growth," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 219-249, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Kocherlakota, Narayana R, 1996. "Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(4), pages 595-609, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, 1999. "Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output per Worker than Others?," NBER Working Papers 6564, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Atkenson, Andrew & Khan, Aubhik & Ohanian, Lee, 1996. "Are data on industry evolution and gross job turnover relevant for macroeconomics?," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 215-239, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Albuquerque, R. & Hopenhayn, H.A., 1997. "Optimal Dynamic Lending Contracts with Imperfect Enforceability," RCER Working Papers 439, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
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  9. Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer, 2002. "Courts: the Lex Mundi Project," NBER Working Papers 8890, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Robert J. Barro, 1991. "Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries," NBER Working Papers 3120, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(1), pages 155-78, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Laitner, John & Ohlsson, Henry, 2001. "Bequest motives: a comparison of Sweden and the United States," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 205-236, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Robert E. Lucas Jr., 1978. "On the Size Distribution of Business Firms," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 9(2), pages 508-523, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Banerjee, Abhijit V & Newman, Andrew F, 1993. "Occupational Choice and the Process of Development," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(2), pages 274-98, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Vincenzo Quadrini, 2000. "Entrepreneurship, Saving and Social Mobility," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(1), pages 1-40, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Thomas Cooley & Ramon Marimon & Vincenzo Quadrini, 2003. "Aggregate Consequences of Limited Contract Enforceability," NBER Working Papers 10132, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. António Antunes & Tiago Cavalcanti & Anne Villamil, 2006. "The Effect of Financial Repression & Enforcement on Entrepreneurship and Economic Development," SCAPE Policy Research Working Paper Series 0610, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics, SCAPE. [Downloadable!]
  3. Alexander Monge-Naranjo, 2009. "Entrepreneurship and firm heterogeneity with limited enforcement," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 465-494, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Francesco Caselli & Nicola Gennaioli, 2006. "Dynastic Management," CEP Discussion Papers dp0741, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Erwan Quintin, 2008. "Contract enforcement and the size of the informal economy," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 395-416, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Ahmet Akyol & Kartik Athreya, 2009. "Self-employment rates and business size: the roles of occupational choice and credit market frictions," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 495-519, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Urban Jermann & Vincenzo Quadrini, 2002. "Stock Market Boom and the Productivity Gains of the 1990s," NBER Working Papers 9034, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Miguel Cardoso-Lecourtois, 2004. "Chain Reactions, Trade Credit and the Business Cycle," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 331, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  9. Cristina Arellano & Yan Bai & Jing Zhang, 2009. "Firm dynamics and financial development," Staff Report 392, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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