Minimum Wage, Public Employment Offices and Unemployment Compensation: John R. Commons's View
AbstractIn accordance with the concept of transaction as introduced by John R. Commons we willinvestigate the contractual and market remedies which labour law may implement to make ‘order’ in theemployer-employee relationship.In this view, one of the most important contractual remedies is the minimum wage. It demarks an inalienabledefault point under which wage bargaining can not drop. Unlike, employability represents the mostimportant concept in order to take into explicit account market dynamics. In this respect, employmentcompensation and public employment offices, involving parties’ outside options, are widely treated.Lastly, we will prove that these two kinds of legal intervention (contract and market regarding) are derivedfrom Commons distinction between liberty and freedom.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Siena in its series Department of Economics University of Siena with number 521.
Date of creation: Nov 2007
Date of revision:
John R. Commons; employability; labour law and economics;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- B25 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Austrian
- B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Institutional; Evolutionary
- J38 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Public Policy
- J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
- K31 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Labor Law
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-03-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAB-2008-03-01 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2008-03-01 (Law & Economics)
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