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Public debt and currency crisis: how central bank opacity can make things bad?

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Dai, Meixing

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Abstract

This paper examines how the transparency in monetary policy decision can impact the likelihood of currency crisis in a simple open economy model with public debt. In the presence of opacity, it is found that if the debt is high, the government will devaluate and vice versa, and the self-fulfilling multiple equilibria solution disappears. Furthermore, the opacity reduces the threshold of public debt above which the government is considered as totally lacking the credibility in its pre-commitment to maintain fixed the exchange rate.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13867/
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 13867.

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Date of creation: Dec 2008
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Publication status: Published in Economics Bulletin 1 .29(2009): pp. 190-198
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:13867

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Related research
Keywords: central bank transparency; public debt; currency crisis; speculative attack.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
F37 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Finance Forecasting and Simulation
O23 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Fiscal and Monetary Policy in Development
E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange

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  1. Courtenay, Roger & Clare, Andrew, 2001. "What can we learn about monetary policy transparency from financial market data?," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2001,06, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
  2. Bernanke, Ben S. & Gertler, Mark & Gilchrist, Simon, 1999. "The financial accelerator in a quantitative business cycle framework," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 21, pages 1341-1393 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Aghion, Philippe & Bacchetta, Philippe & Banerjee, Abhijit, 2001. "Currency crises and monetary policy in an economy with credit constraints," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(7), pages 1121-1150. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Jean-Pierre ALLEGRET & Camille CORNAND, 2006. "The pros and cons of higher transparency : the case of speculative attacks," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2006031, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES). [Downloadable!]
  5. Heinemann, Frank & Illing, Gerhard, 2002. "Speculative attacks: unique equilibrium and transparency," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 429-450, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1996. "Models of Currency Crises with Self-fulfilling Features," CEPR Discussion Papers 1315, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Flood, Robert P. & Garber, Peter M., 1984. "Collapsing exchange-rate regimes : Some linear examples," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1-2), pages 1-13, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Giannetti, Mariassunta, 2007. "Financial liberalization and banking crises: The role of capital inflows and lack of transparency," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 32-63, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Jeffrey Sachs & Aaron Tornell & Andres Velasco, 1996. "The Mexican Peso Crisis: Sudden Death or Death Foretold?," NBER Working Papers 5563, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Amato, Jeffery D. & Gerlach, Stefan, 2002. "Inflation targeting in emerging market and transition economies: Lessons after a decade," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 781-790, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Maurice Obstfeld, 1994. "The Logic of Currency Crises," NBER Working Papers 4640, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Jean-Pierre Allegret & Camille Cornand, 2006. "The pros and cons of higher transparency: the case of speculative attacks," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 72(3), pages 215-246. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Vaugirard, Victor, 2007. "Informational contagion of bank runs in a third-generation crisis model," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 403-429, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Muller, P. & M. Zelmer, 1999. "Greater Transparency in Monetary Policy: Impact on Financial Markets," Technical Reports 86, Bank of Canada. [Downloadable!]
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  18. Roberto Chang & Andrés Velasco, 2001. "A Model Of Financial Crises In Emerging Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(2), pages 489-517, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Ehrmann, Michael & Fratzscher, Marcel, 2007. "The timing of central bank communication," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 124-145, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  20. Petra M. Geraats, 2002. "Central Bank Transparency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 532-565, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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