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Expectations and information in second generation currency crises models

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Author Info
Massimo Sbracia () (Banca dÂ’Italia, Research Department)
Andrea Zaghini () (Banca dÂ’Italia, Research Department)

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Abstract

We explore the role of expectations in second generation currency crisis models, proving that sudden shifts in speculators' beliefs can trigger currency devaluations, even without any sizable worsening in the fundamentals. In our incomplete information game, mean-preserving changes in speculatorsÂ’ expectations may drive agents to a unique equilibrium with a self-fulfilling attack. In particular, our model supports the thesis that uncertainty matters, since a sufficiently large increase in speculators' uncertainty over the fundamentals is likely to trigger a currency crisis. Following a recent line of research, we also compare the results of private and public information models and find the following paradox; if speculators have private information, the fact that the state of fundamentals is publicly revealed turns out to be more advantageous to the government when fundamentals are bad.

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Paper provided by Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department in its series Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) with number 391.

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Date of creation: Dec 2000
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Handle: RePEc:bdi:wptemi:td_391_00

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Related research
Keywords: currency crises; speculative attack; multiple equilibria;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange
F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 1997. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-fulfilling Currency Attacks," CEPR Discussion Papers 1687, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Kyoji Fukao, 1994. "Coordination Failures under Incomplete Information and Global Ggames," Discussion Paper Series a299, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
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  3. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384.
  4. Maurice Obstfeld, 1997. "Models of Currency Crises with Self-Fulfilling Features," NBER Working Papers 5285, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Flood, Robert P. & Garber, Peter M., 1984. "Collapsing exchange-rate regimes : Some linear examples," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1-2), pages 1-13, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1989. "The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under "Almost Common Knowledge."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 385-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Maurice Obstfeld, 1994. "The Logic of Currency Crises," NBER Working Papers 4640, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 989-1018, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Krugman, Paul, 1979. "A Model of Balance-of-Payments Crises," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 11(3), pages 311-25, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1986. "Rational and Self-fulfilling Balance-of-Payments Crises," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(1), pages 72-81, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Luca Dedola & Eugenio Gaiotti & Luca Silipo, 2004. "Money Demand in theEuroArea: Do National Differences Matter?," Macroeconomics 0404019, EconWPA, revised 24 Apr 2004. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Jean-Pierre Allegret & Camille Cornand, 2005. "The Pros and Cons of Higher Transparency: The Case of Speculative Attacks," Working Papers 0502, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure. [Downloadable!]
  3. Monica Paiella, 2001. "Limited Financial Market Participation: A Transaction Cost-Based Explanation," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 415, Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Emilia Bonaccorsi di Patti & Giorgio Gobbi, 2001. "The Effects of Bank Consolidation and Market Entry on Small Business Lending," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 404, Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  5. M. Sbracia & Alessandro Prati, 2002. "Currency Crises and Uncertainty About Fundamentals," IMF Working Papers 02/3, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Christina E. Bannier, 2003. "Privacy or Publicity - Who Drives the Wheel?," Game Theory and Information 0309006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  7. Dai, Meixing, 2008. "Public debt and currency crisis: how central bank opacity can make things bad?," MPRA Paper 13867, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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