Expectations and information in second generation currency crises models
We explore the role of expectations in second generation currency crisis models, proving that sudden shifts in speculators' beliefs can trigger currency devaluations, even without any sizable worsening in the fundamentals. In our incomplete information game, mean-preserving changes in speculatorsï¿½ expectations may drive agents to a unique equilibrium with a self-fulfilling attack. In particular, our model supports the thesis that uncertainty matters, since a sufficiently large increase in speculators' uncertainty over the fundamentals is likely to trigger a currency crisis. Following a recent line of research, we also compare the results of private and public information models and find the following paradox; if speculators have private information, the fact that the state of fundamentals is publicly revealed turns out to be more advantageous to the government when fundamentals are bad.
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