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Training, Rent-Sharing and Unions

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  • Booth, Alison L
  • Francesconi, Marco
  • Zoega, Gylfi

Abstract

We investigate two dimensions of investment in general human capital on-the-job: the number of workers trained and the intensity of training for each worker. In the benchmark case, we consider wage and training decisions made by firms in an imperfectly competitive labour market. The benchmark case generates two types of market failure: too few workers are trained, and the workers who are hired receive too little training. This is caused by the firms' discount rate exceeding the social discount rate, due to a 'quitting externality'. We show that the presence of labour unions can increase social welfare by increasing training intensity, while reducing welfare by lowering the number of workers trained. Using the British Household Panel Survey, we confirm the predictions of the model.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 2200.

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Date of creation: Aug 1999
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2200

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Related research

Keywords: General Training; Human Capital; Labour Unions; Quitting Externalities;

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References

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  1. Miller, M. & Ippolito, R. & Zhang, L., 1997. "Shareholders and Stakeholder: Human Capital and Industry Equilibrium," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 481, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  2. Daron Acemoglu & Jorn-Steffen Pischke, 1998. "The Structure of Wages and Investment in General Training," NBER Working Papers 6357, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Malcomson, James M. & Maw, James W. & McCormick, Barry, 2000. "General training by firms, apprentice contracts, and public policy," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0021, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  4. Chang, Chun & Wang, Yijiang, 1996. "Human Capital Investment under Asymmetric Information: The Pigovian Conjecture Revisited," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(3), pages 505-19, July.
  5. Acemoglu, D. & Pischki, J.S., 1996. "Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence," Working papers 96-7, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  6. Lynch, Lisa M, 1992. "Private-Sector Training and the Earnings of Young Workers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 299-312, March.
  7. Booth, Alison L, 1991. "Job-Related Formal Training: Who Receives It and What Is It Worth?," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 53(3), pages 281-94, August.
  8. David De Meza & Ben Lockwood, 1998. "Does Asset Ownership Always Motivate Managers? Outside Options And The Property Rights Theory Of The Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(2), pages 361-386, May.
  9. Booth, Alison L & Chatterji, Monojit, 1998. "Unions and Efficient Training," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(447), pages 328-43, March.
  10. Klemperer, Paul, 1995. "Competition When Consumers Have Switching Costs: An Overview with Applications to Industrial Organization, Macroeconomics, and International Trade," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(4), pages 515-39, October.
  11. Lee, Lung-fei & Maddala, G S & Trost, R P, 1980. "Asymptotic Covariance Matrices of Two-Stage Probit and Two-Stage Tobit Methods for Simultaneous Equations Models with Selectivity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(2), pages 491-503, March.
  12. Booth, Alison L & Zoega, Gylfi, 1999. "Do Quits Cause Under-Training?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(2), pages 374-86, April.
  13. Stevens, Margaret, 1994. "A Theoretical Model of On-the-Job Training with Imperfect Competition," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(4), pages 537-62, October.
  14. Chiu, Y Stephen, 1998. "Noncooperative Bargaining, Hostages, and Optimal Asset Ownership," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 882-901, September.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Brunello, Giorgio & Gambarotto, Francesca, 2004. "Agglomeration Effects on Employer-Provided Training: Evidence from the UK," IZA Discussion Papers 1055, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  2. Giorgio Brunello & Maria De Paola, 2004. "Market Failures and the Under-Provision of Training," CESifo Working Paper Series 1286, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Luca Nunziata, 2005. "Institutions and Wage Determination: a Multi-country Approach," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 67(4), pages 435-466, 08.
  4. Blunch, Niels-Hugo & Verner, Dorte, 2001. "Asymmetries in union relative wage effects in Ghanaian manufacturing - an analysis applying quantile regressions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2570, The World Bank.
  5. Rita Asplund, 2005. "The Provision and Effects of Company Training: A Brief Review of the Literature," Nordic Journal of Political Economy, Nordic Journal of Political Economy, vol. 31, pages 47-73.
  6. Lorraine Dearden & Howard Reed & John Van Reenen, 2006. "The Impact of Training on Productivity and Wages: Evidence from British Panel Data," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 68(4), pages 397-421, 08.
  7. Asplund, Rita, 2004. "The Provision and Effects of Company Training. A brief review of the literature," Discussion Papers 907, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
  8. Bassanini, Andrea & Booth, Alison L. & Brunello, Giorgio & De Paola, Maria & Leuven, Edwin, 2005. "Workplace Training in Europe," IZA Discussion Papers 1640, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  9. Booth, Alison L & Zoega, Gylfi, 2000. "Why Do Firms Invest in General Training? 'Good' Firms and 'Bad' Firms as a Source of Monopsony Power," CEPR Discussion Papers 2536, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Panos, Sousounis, 2009. "The Impact of Work-Related Training on Employee Earnings: Evidence from Great Britain," MPRA Paper 14262, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  11. Giuseppe Croce, 2005. "A model of training policies in an imperfectly competitive labour market," Working Papers 90, University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Public Economics.
  12. repec:ese:iserwp:2001-08 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Blunch, Niels-Hugo & Verner, Dorthe, 2001. "Assymetries in Union Relative Wage Effects in Ghanian Manufacturing - An analysis Applying Quantile Regressions," CLS Working Papers 01-7, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Centre for Labour Market and Social Research.

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