A Theoretical Model of On-the-Job Training with Imperfect Competition
AbstractTraining for skills that are transferable to other firms, but for which the external labor market is imperfectly competitive, cannot be analyzed using the traditional tools of general and specific training. It is known that firms (as well as workers) have an incentive to invest in such training but that there is an externality problem that may lead to underinvestment. Using a formal model, it is shown that the problem is most severe at 'intermediate' levels of labor-market competition. The effects are that too few workers are trained and there is overinvestment in purely specific training. Copyright 1994 by Royal Economic Society.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Oxford Economic Papers.
Volume (Year): 46 (1994)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://oep.oupjournals.org/
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.