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Citations of
Wojciech Olszewski

For current contact information and a more complete listing of works, please see here

The citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.

| Working papers | Articles | Access and download statistics

Working papers

  1. George Mailath & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Folk theorems with Bounded Recall under(Almost) Perfect Monitoring," Discussion Papers 1462, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:

    Cited by:

    1. V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2009. "A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 09-029, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

  2. Alvaro Sandroni & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Manipulability of Future-Independent Tests," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-014, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Alvaro Sandroni & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Strategic Manipulation of Empirical Tests," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-015, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    2. Alvaro Sandroni & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Falsifiability," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-016, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
    3. Colin Stewart, 2009. "Nonmanipulable Bayesian Testing," Working Papers tecipa-360, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

  3. Alvaro Sandroni & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Falsifiability," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-016, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]

    Cited by:

    1. Alvaro Sandroni & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Manipulability of Future-Independent Tests," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-014, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    2. Alvaro Sandroni & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Strategic Manipulation of Empirical Tests," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-015, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

  4. Wojciech Olszewski & Alvaro Sandroni, 2006. "Strategic Manipulation of Empirical Tests," Discussion Papers 1425, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:

    Cited by:

    1. Alvaro Sandroni & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Manipulability of Future-Independent Tests," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-014, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    2. Colin Stewart, 2009. "Nonmanipulable Bayesian Testing," Working Papers tecipa-360, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    3. Feinberg, Yossi & Stewart, Colin, 2007. "Testing Multiple Forecasters," Research Papers 1957, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

  5. Johannes Horner & Wojciech Olszewski, 2005. "The Folk Theorem for Games with Private, Almost-Perfect Monitoring," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 172782000000000006, www.najecon.org. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Michihiro Kandori, 2006. "Repeated Games, Entry in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-395, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
    2. Ichiro Obara, 2005. "Folk Theorem with Communication," UCLA Economics Online Papers 366, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    3. George Mailath & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Folk theorems with Bounded Recall under(Almost) Perfect Monitoring," Discussion Papers 1462, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    4. Joyee Deb, 2008. "Cooperation and Community Responsibility: A Folk Theorem for Repeated Matching Games with Names," Working Papers 08-24, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    5. Wojciech Olszewski, 2007. "A Simple Exposition of Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 3(58), pages 1-16. [Downloadable!]
    6. Michihiro Kandori, 2007. "Weakly Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-491, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
    7. George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001105, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

  6. Wojciech Olszewski & Johannes Horner, 2004. "The folk theorem for all games with almost perfect monitoring," 2004 Meeting Papers 475, Society for Economic Dynamics. [Downloadable!]

    Cited by:

    1. Eiichi Miyagawa & Yasuyuki Miyahara & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2004. "The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs," Discussion Papers 0405-12, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

  7. Jeffrey C. Ely & Johannes Horner & Wojciech Olszewski, 2003. "Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 666156000000000367, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2008. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(3), pages 515-528, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
    2. Josh Cherry & Lones Smith, 2009. "Unattainable Payoffs for Repeated Games of Private Monitoring," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000284, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    3. LOVO, Stefano & HÖRNER, Johanes, 2006. "Belief-free Equilibria in games with incomplete information," Les Cahiers de Recherche 845, HEC Paris. [Downloadable!]
    4. Christopher Phelan & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2006. "Private monitoring with infinite histories," Staff Report 383, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
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    5. Joyee Deb, 2008. "Cooperation and Community Responsibility: A Folk Theorem for Repeated Matching Games with Names," Working Papers 08-24, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    6. Wojciech Olszewski, 2007. "A Simple Exposition of Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 3(58), pages 1-16. [Downloadable!]
    7. George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2004. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-014, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 23 Mar 2005. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    8. Ichiro Obara, . "Endogenous Monitoring," UCLA Economics Online Papers 398, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    9. Michihiro Kandori, 2007. "Weakly Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-491, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
    10. Eiichi Miyagawa & Yasuyuki Miyahara & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2004. "The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs," Discussion Papers 0405-12, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    11. Stefano, LOVO, 2007. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information," Les Cahiers de Recherche 884, HEC Paris. [Downloadable!]
    12. V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 07-024, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 20 Aug 2007. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

Articles

  1. Wojciech Olszewski & Alvaro Sandroni, 2008. "Manipulability of Future-Independent Tests," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(6), pages 1437-1466, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  2. Sandroni, Alvaro & Olszewski, Wojciech, 2007. "Contracts and uncertainty," Theoretical Economics, Society for Economic Theory, vol. 2(1), pages 1-13, March. [Downloadable!]

    Cited by:

    1. Alvaro Sandroni & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Manipulability of Future-Independent Tests," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-014, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    2. Alvaro Sandroni & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Falsifiability," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-016, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]

  3. Wojciech Olszewski, 2007. "Preferences Over Sets of Lotteries," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 74(2), pages 567-595, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Thibault Gajdos & Takashi Hayashi & Jean-Marc Tallon & Jean-Christophe Vergnaud, 2008. "Attitude toward imprecise information," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00177378_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
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    2. Marie-Louise Vierø, 2009. "Exactly what happens after the Anscombe–Aumann race?," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 175-212, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    3. Tigran Melkonyan & Mark Pingle, 2008. "Ambiguity, Pessimism, and Religious Choice," Working Papers 08-002, University of Nevada, Reno, Department of Economics & University of Nevada, Reno , Department of Resource Economics. [Downloadable!]
    4. Thibault Gajdos & Jean-Marc Tallon & Jean-Christophe Vergnaud, 2002. "Coping with imprecise information : a decision theoretic approach," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques v04056, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), revised May 2004. [Downloadable!]
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    5. Raphaël Giraud, 2006. "Objective Imprecise Probabilistic Information, Second Order Beliefs and Ambiguity Aversion: an Axiomatization," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00102346_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]

  4. Olszewski, Wojciech & Chung, Kim-Sau, 2007. "A non-differentiable approach to revenue equivalence," Theoretical Economics, Society for Economic Theory, vol. 2(4), pages 469-487, December. [Downloadable!]

    Cited by:

    1. First:Birgit Heydenreich & Rudolf Muller & Marc Uetz & Rakesh Vohra, 2007. "Characterization of Revenue Equivalence," Discussion Papers 1448, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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    2. Svaiter, Benar Fux & Monteiro, Paulo Klinger, 2008. "Optimal auction with a general distribution: virtual valuation without densities," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 681, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil). [Downloadable!]

  5. Johannes Hörner & Wojciech Olszewski, 2006. "The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(6), pages 1499-1544, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  6. Jeffrey C. Ely & Johannes Hörner & Wojciech Olszewski, 2005. "Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(2), pages 377-415, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  7. Olszewski, Wojciech, 2004. "Informal communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 180-200, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Irene Valsecchi, 2008. "Learning from Experts," Working Papers 2008.35, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
    2. Di Maggio, Marco, 2009. "Accountability and Cheap Talk," MPRA Paper 18652, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    3. Andreas Blume & Oliver Board & Kohei Kawamura, 2007. "Noisy Talk," ESE Discussion Papers 167, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
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      • Board, Oliver J. & Blume, Andreas & Kawamura, Kohei, 2007. "Noisy talk," Theoretical Economics, Society for Economic Theory, vol. 2(4), pages 395-440, December. [Downloadable!]
    4. Junichiro Ishida & Takashi Shimizu, 2009. "Cheap Talk with an Informed Receiver," ISER Discussion Paper 0746, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University. [Downloadable!]
    5. Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse Shapiro, 2005. "Media Bias and Reputation," NBER Working Papers 11664, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
    6. Li, Ming & Tymofiy Mylovanov, 2009. "Credibility for Sale: the Effect of Disclosure on Information Acquisition and Transmission," Working Papers 09008, Concordia University, Department of Economics, revised Oct 2009. [Downloadable!]

  8. Wojciech Olszewski & Howard Rosenthal, 2004. "Politically Determined Income Inequality and the Provision of Public Goods," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 6(5), pages 707-735, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Sita Nataraj Slavov, 2006. "Public versus Private Provision of Public Goods," Occidental Economics Working Papers 2, Occidental College, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2006. [Downloadable!]
    2. John Hartwick, 2006. "The Control of Land Rent in the Fortified Farming Town," Working Papers 1096, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

  9. Olszewski, Wojciech, 2004. "Coalition strategy-proof mechanisms for provision of excludable public goods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 88-114, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Felix Bierbrauer, 2008. "A unified approach to the revelation of public goods preferences and to optimal income taxation," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008_39, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]

  10. Olszewski, Wojciech, 2003. "A simple and general solution to King Solomon's problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 315-318, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Mihara, H. Reiju, 2008. "The second-price auction solves King Solomon's dilemma," MPRA Paper 8801, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    2. Cheng-Zhong Qin & Chun-Lei Yang, 2009. "Make a guess: a robust mechanism for King Solomon’s dilemma," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 259-268, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    3. Georgy Artemov, 2006. "Imminent Nash Implementation as a Solution to King Solomon's Dilemma," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 4(14), pages 1-8. [Downloadable!]
    4. Cheng-Zhong Qin, 2006. "Bid and Guess: A Nested Mechanism for King Solomon's Dilemma," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 03-06, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
    5. Bag, P.K. & Sabourian, H., 2004. "Distributing Awards Efficiently: More on King Solomon’s Problem," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0418, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-14.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.