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The Control of Land Rent in the Fortified Farming Town

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  • John Hartwick

    ()
    (Queen's University)

Abstract

We consider costly administration at the center of a farming community surrounding a fortified village. Land rent taxation is high cost mode of financing central administration in a tax incidence sense. Participatory administration by the governed is a lower cost alternative. We speculate why the low cost option has been out-competed by its higher cost alternative throughout history. We also take up constraints on predation on farmers by a landlord at the center.

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File URL: http://qed.econ.queensu.ca/working_papers/papers/qed_wp_1096.pdf
File Function: First version 2006
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Queen's University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1096.

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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:qed:wpaper:1096

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Keywords: administrative structure; public goods; welfare cost;

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  1. William Jack & Roger Lagunoff, 2003. "Dynamic Enfranchisement," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000030, UCLA Department of Economics.
  2. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2000. "Why Did The West Extend The Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, And Growth In Historical Perspective," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(4), pages 1167-1199, November.
  3. Edward J. Green, 1993. "On the emergence of parliamentary government: the role of private information," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 2-16.
  4. Duncan Black & Vernon Henderson, 1999. "A Theory of Urban Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(2), pages 252-284, April.
  5. Helsley, Robert W. & Strange, William C., 1990. "Matching and agglomeration economies in a system of cities," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 189-212, September.
  6. North, Douglass C. & Thomas, Robert Paul, 1971. "The Rise and Fall of the Manorial System: A Theoretical Model," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(04), pages 777-803, December.
  7. Dan Usher, 1986. "The Dynastic Cycle and the Stationary State," Working Papers 671, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  8. Martin C. McGuire & Mancur Olson Jr., 1996. "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(1), pages 72-96, March.
  9. Flatters, Frank & Henderson, Vernon & Mieszkowski, Peter, 1974. "Public goods, efficiency, and regional fiscal equalization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 99-112, May.
  10. Wojciech Olszewski & Howard Rosenthal, 2004. "Politically Determined Income Inequality and the Provision of Public Goods," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 6(5), pages 707-735, December.
  11. John M. Hartwick, 1980. "The Henry George Rule, Optimal Population, and Interregional Equity," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 13(4), pages 695-700, November.
  12. Arnott, Richard J & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1979. "Aggregate Land Rents, Expenditure on Public Goods, and Optimal City Size," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 93(4), pages 471-500, November.
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