Goods Revenue Monotonicity in Combinatorial Auctions
AbstractWe study a new monotonicity problem in combinatorial auctions called goods revenue monotonicity, which requires that the auctioneer earn no more revenue by dropping goods from the endowments. Although no mechanism satisfies goods revenue monotonicity together with strategy-proofness, efficiency, and participation even in the domain of substitute valuations, we find a restricted domain called per-capita goodsbidder submodular domain in which there exists a goods revenue monotone mechanism satisfying the above three conditions. The restriction is likely to be met when bidders’ valuations are similar. Finally, we provide a relation to the monopoly theory, and argue that per-capita goods-bidder submodularily is independent of the standard elasticity argument.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University in its series Discussion Papers with number 2013-13.
Length: 20 p.
Date of creation: Oct 2013
Date of revision:
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