Alvaro Sandroni () (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania) Wojciech Olszewski () (Department of Economics, Northwestern University)
Abstract
Theories can be produced by experts seeking a reputation for having knowledge. Hence, a tester could anticipate that theories may have been strategically produced by uninformed experts who want to pass an empirical test. We show that, with no restriction on the domain of permissible theories, strategic experts cannot be discredited for an arbitrary but given number of periods, no matter which test is used (provided that the test does not reject the actual data-generating process). Natural ways around this impossibility result include 1) assuming that unbounded data sets are available and 2) restricting the domain of permissible theories (opening the possibility that the actual data-generating process is rejected out of hand). In both cases, it is possible to dismiss strategic experts, but only to a limited extent. These results show significant limits on what data can accomplish when experts produce theories strategically.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania in its series PIER Working Paper Archive with number
08-015.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty C11 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: General - - - Bayesian Analysis
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Nabil I. Al-Najjar & Jonathan Weinstein, 2008.
"Comparative Testing of Experts,"
Econometrica,
Econometric Society, vol. 76(3), pages 541-559, 05.
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