IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000509/018207.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Screening multiple potentially false experts

Author

Listed:
  • Francisco Barreras
  • Álvaro José Riascos Villegas

Abstract

A decision maker is presented with a theory from a self proclaimed expert about the probability of occurrence of certain events. The decision maker faces the possibility that the expert is completely ignorant about the data generating process and so she’s interested in mechanisms that allow her to screen informed experts from uninformed ones. The decision maker needs to control for type I error, however, since she’s also uncertain about the true stochastic process, this gives room for uninformed experts to make strategic forecasts and ignorantly pass tests and profit from contracts. We present an original multiple expert model where a contract achieves screening of informed and uninformed experts by means of pitting experts’ predictions against each other. Additionally, we present a theoretical review of the main findings in two branches of literature that attempt to solve the expert screening problem. Namely models about testing experts and models in contract theory that pursue screening of experts.

Suggested Citation

  • Francisco Barreras & Álvaro José Riascos Villegas, 2016. "Screening multiple potentially false experts," Monografías 18207, Quantil.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000509:018207
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://richter.quantil.co/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/sme-1.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nabil I. Al-Najjar & Jonathan Weinstein, 2008. "Comparative Testing of Experts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(3), pages 541-559, May.
    2. Carvajal, Andrés, 2009. "Statistical calibration: A simplification of Foster's proof," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 272-277, September.
    3. Alvaro Sandroni, 2003. "The reproducible properties of correct forecasts," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 32(1), pages 151-159, December.
    4. Eddie Dekel & Yossi Feinberg, 2006. "Non-Bayesian Testing of a Stochastic Prediction," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 73(4), pages 893-906.
    5. Wojciech Olszewski & Alvaro Sandroni, 2006. "Strategic Manipulation of Empirical Tests," Discussion Papers 1425, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    6. Wojciech Olszewski & Marcin Pęski, 2011. "The Principal-Agent Approach to Testing Experts," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(2), pages 89-113, May.
    7. Alvaro Sandroni, 2014. "At Least Do No Harm: The Use of Scarce Data," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 1-3, February.
    8. Olszewski, Wojciech, 2015. "Calibration and Expert Testing," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    9. Gilboa, Itzhak & Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 141-153, April.
    10. , & ,, 2007. "Contracts and uncertainty," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(1), pages 1-13, March.
    11. Yossi Feinberg & Colin Stewart, 2008. "Testing Multiple Forecasters," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(3), pages 561-582, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Colin, Stewart, 2011. "Nonmanipulable Bayesian testing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 2029-2041, September.
    2. Wojciech Olszewski & Alvaro Sandroni, 2008. "Manipulability of Future-Independent Tests," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(6), pages 1437-1466, November.
    3. Dean Foster & Rakesh Vohra, 2011. "Calibration: Respice, Adspice, Prospice," Discussion Papers 1537, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    4. Olszewski, Wojciech, 2015. "Calibration and Expert Testing," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    5. Yossi Feinberg & Nicolas Lambert, 2015. "Mostly calibrated," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(1), pages 153-163, February.
    6. David Lagziel & Ehud Lehrer, 2021. "Transferable deposits as a screening mechanism," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(2), pages 483-504, March.
    7. Al-Najjar, Nabil & Sandroni, Alvaro, 2013. "A difficulty in the testing of strategic experts," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 5-9.
    8. Alvaro Sandroni & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Falsifiability," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-016, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    9. Wojciech Olszewski & Alvaro Sandroni, 2006. "Strategic Manipulation of Empirical Tests," Discussion Papers 1425, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    10. Yossi Feinberg & Colin Stewart, 2008. "Testing Multiple Forecasters," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(3), pages 561-582, May.
    11. Kavaler, Itay & Smorodinsky, Rann, 2019. "On comparison of experts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 94-109.
    12. Itay Kavaler & Rann Smorodinsky, 2019. "A Cardinal Comparison of Experts," Papers 1908.10649, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2020.
    13. Francisco Barreras, 2017. "Screening Multiple Uninformed Experts," Documentos de Trabajo 15282, Quantil.
    14. Wojciech Olszewski & Alvaro Sandroni, 2011. "Falsifiability," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(2), pages 788-818, April.
    15. Wojciech Olszewski & Alvaro Sandroni, 2009. "Strategic Manipulation of Empirical Tests," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 34(1), pages 57-70, February.
    16. Al-Najjar, Nabil I. & Sandroni, Alvaro & Smorodinsky, Rann & Weinstein, Jonathan, 2010. "Testing theories with learnable and predictive representations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2203-2217, November.
    17. DeMarzo, Peter M. & Kremer, Ilan & Mansour, Yishay, 2016. "Robust option pricing: Hannan and Blackwell meet Black and Scholes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 410-434.
    18. , & ,, 2013. "Expressible inspections," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(2), May.
    19. Sylvain Chassang, 2013. "Calibrated Incentive Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(5), pages 1935-1971, September.
    20. Rahul Deb & Mallesh M. Pai & Maher Said, 2018. "Evaluating Strategic Forecasters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(10), pages 3057-3103, October.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:col:000509:018207. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Administrador (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.