This paper considers the problem of testing an expert who makes probabilistic forecasts about the outcomes of a stochastic process. I show that, under general conditions on the tester's prior, a likelihood test can distinguish informed from uninformed experts with high prior probability. The test rejects informed experts on data-generating processes where the tester quickly learns the true probabilities by updating her prior. However, the set of processes on which informed experts are rejected is topologically small. These results contrast sharply with many negative results in the literature.
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Paper provided by University of Toronto, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
tecipa-360.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C44 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Statistical Decision Theory; Operations Research D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Nabil I. Al-Najjar & Jonathan Weinstein, 2008.
"Comparative Testing of Experts,"
Econometrica,
Econometric Society, vol. 76(3), pages 541-559, 05.
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