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Weak and Strong Merging of Opinions

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Author Info
Ehud Kalai
Ehud Lehrer

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Abstract

We study merging, in a few senses, of two measures when increasing sequence of information is observed. Motivating this extension of Blackwell and Dubins' (1962) work, are studies of convergence to equilibrium in infinite games and in dynamic economies.

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File URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/983.pdf
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Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 983.

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Date of creation: Feb 1992
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Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:983

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1019-45, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer, 1990. "Merging Economic Forecasts," Discussion Papers 1035, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  3. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993. "Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1231-40, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Alvaro Sandroni, . ""Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergence to Nash Equilibrium: The Almost Absolute Continuity Hypothesis''," CARESS Working Papres 95-08, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  2. Yossi Feinberg & Marco Scarsini, 2003. "Rate of Arbitrage and Reconciled Beliefs," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 4(11), pages 1-12. [Downloadable!]
  3. Alvaro Sandroni, 1997. "Learning Rare Events," Discussion Papers 1199, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  4. Matthew O. Jackson & Ehud Kalai & Rann Smorodinsky, 1998. "Bayesian Representation of Stochastic Processes under Learning: de Finetti Revisited," Discussion Papers 1228, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Matthew O. Jackson & Ehud Kalai & Rann Smorodinsky, 1997. "Patterns, Types, and Bayesian Learning," Game Theory and Information 9711002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer, 1990. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Discussion Papers 925, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Echenique, Federico & Shmaya, Eran, 2007. "You won’t harm me if you fool me," Working Papers 1281, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  8. Mario Gilli, 2002. "Rational Learning in Imperfect Monitoring Games," Working Papers 46, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2002. [Downloadable!]
  9. Dimitrios P. Tsomocos & Dimitris Voliotis, 2005. "A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Convergence of Statistical to Strategic Equilibria of Market Games," OFRC Working Papers Series 2005fe14, Oxford Financial Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
  10. Arnoud W.A. Boot & Anjan V. Thakor, 2003. "The Economic Value of Flexibility when there is Disagreement," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-002/2, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer, 1990. "Merging Economic Forecasts," Discussion Papers 1035, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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