Justifiable preferences
Abstract
We characterize preferences over acts that can be represented by a utility function and a multiple-prior, such that an act f is preferred to act g if there is a prior under which the expected utility induced by f is higher than that induced by g. These preferences are referred to as justifiable preferences. We further introduce a generalized model of ambiguity that involves a collection of multiple-priors, namely, multiple multiple-priors and incorporate Bewley[modifier letter apostrophe]s Knightian model in justifiability: f is preferred to g if, according to at least one set of priors, f is unanimously preferred to g.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 146 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
Pages: 762-774
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
Related research
Keywords: Justifiable preferences Multiple-prior Multiple multiple-prior;References
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Pierpaolo Battigalli & Simone Cerreia-Vioglio & Fabio Maccheroni & Massimo Marinacci, 2012. "Analysis of Information Feedback and Selfconfirming Equilibrium," Working Papers 459, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
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