In recent decades, the concept of subjective probability has been increasingly applied to an adversaryÕs choices in strategic games. A careful examination reveals that the standard construction of subjective probabilities does not apply in this context. We show how the difficulty may be overcome by means of a different construction, and provide an axiomatic fondation for it.
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R. J. Aumann & J. H. Dreze, 2004.
"Assessing Strategic Risk,"
Discussion Paper Series
dp361, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
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AUMANN, Robert J. & DREZE, Jacques H., 2005.
"Assessing strategic risk,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2005020, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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Frank Heinemann & Rosemarie Nagel & Peter Ockenfels, 2004.
"Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games,"
Discussion Papers
6, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
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