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Is Bayesian Rationality Compatible with Strategic Rationality?

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  • Mariotti, Marco

Abstract

In Bayesian game theory, each player obeys the Savage axioms and there is common knowledge of this. The author shows that two of the less controversial axioms (ordering and dominance) are incompatible with some elementary game theoretic principles. He furthermore argues that his impossibility result is the consequence of a more fundamental conflict between the states of nature/acts framework of decision theory and the principles of strategic rationality. Copyright 1995 by Royal Economic Society.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.

Volume (Year): 105 (1995)
Issue (Month): 432 (September)
Pages: 1099-1109

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Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:105:y:1995:i:432:p:1099-1109

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Cited by:
  1. R.J., AUMANN & Jacques-Henri, DREZE, 2005. "When All is Said and Done, How Should You Play and What Should You Expect ?," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2005021, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
  2. AUMANN, Robert J. & DREZE, Jacques H., . "Assessing strategic risk," CORE Discussion Papers RP -2089, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. Defalvard, Hervé, 2000. "Croyances individuelles et coordination sociale," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 76(3), pages 341-364, septembre.
  4. Teng, Jimmy, 2012. "Solving Two Sided Incomplete Information Games with Bayesian Iterative Conjectures Approach," MPRA Paper 40061, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 12 Jul 2012.
  5. Teng, Jimmy, 2010. "Bayesian Theory of Games: A Statistical Decision Theoretic Based Analysis of Strategic Interactions," MPRA Paper 24189, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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