Assessing strategic risk

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Assessing strategic risk

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AUMANN, Robert J.
DREZE, Jacques H.

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Robert J. Aumann

Abstract

In recent decades, the concept of subjective probability has been increasingly applied to an adversary's choices in strategic games. A careful examination reveals that the standard construction of subjective probabilities does not apply in this context. We show how the difficulty may be overcome by means of a different construction, and provide an axiomatic foundation for it.

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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2005020.

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Date of creation: 01 Feb 2005
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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2005020

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Article
- R. J. Aumann & J. H. Dreze, 2009. "Assessing Strategic Risk," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 1-16, February. [Downloadable!]
Paper
- R. J. Aumann & J. H. Dreze, 2004. "Assessing Strategic Risk," Discussion Paper Series dp361, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
- R.J., AUMANN & Jacques-Henri, DREZE, 2005. "Assessing Strategic Risk," Discussion Papers (ECON - DÃ©partement des Sciences Economiques) 2005020, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques. [Downloadable!]

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, December.
Mariotti, Marco, 1995. "Is Bayesian Rationality Compatible with Strategic Rationality?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(432), pages 1099-1109, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
O'Neill, Barry, 1994. "Game theory models of peace and war," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 29, pages 995-1053 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1987. "Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1391-1402, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Frank Heinemann & Rosemarie Nagel & Peter Ockenfels, 2004. "Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Frank Heinemann & Rosemarie Nagel & Peter Ockenfels, 2004. "Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games," Discussion Papers 6, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
- Frank Heinemann & Rosemarie Nagel & Peter Ockenfels, 2004. "Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games," Economics Working Papers 804, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
- Frank Heinemann & Rosemarie Nagel & Peter Ockenfels, 2009. "Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 76(1), pages 181-221, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Jacques H. , DREZE, 2005. "Nested identification of subjective probabilities," Discussion Papers (ECON - DÃ©partement des Sciences Economiques) 2005061, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques. [Downloadable!]

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