Evaluating Strategic Forecasters
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Other versions of this item:
- Rahul Deb & Mallesh M. Pai & Maher Said, 2018. "Evaluating Strategic Forecasters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(10), pages 3057-3103, October.
- Rahul Deb & Mallesh M. Pai & Maher Said, 2018. "Evaluating Strategic Forecasters," Working Papers 18-23, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Rahul Deb & Mallesh Pai & Maher Said, 2017. "Evaluating Strategic Forecasters," Working Papers tecipa-578, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Cipullo, Davide & Reslow, André, 2019.
"Biased Forecasts to Affect Voting Decisions? The Brexit Case,"
Working Paper Series
364, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden).
- Cipullo, Davide & Reslow, André, 2019. "Biased Forecasts to Affect Voting Decisions? The Brexit Case," Working Paper Series 2019:4, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
- Aleksei Smirnov & Egor Starkov, 2019. "Timing of predictions in dynamic cheap talk: experts vs. quacks," ECON - Working Papers 334, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
- Dirk Bergemann & Tan Gan & Yingkai Li, 2023.
"Managing Persuasion Robustly: The Optimality of Quota Rules,"
Papers
2310.10024, arXiv.org.
- Dirk Bergemann & Tan Gan & Yingkai Li, 2023. "Managing Persuasion Robustly: The Optimality of Quota Rules," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2372, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- repec:cup:judgdm:v:15:y:2020:i:5:p:863-880 is not listed on IDEAS
- Yingkai Li & Jonathan Libgober, 2023. "Optimal Scoring for Dynamic Information Acquisition," Papers 2310.19147, arXiv.org.
- Andrew Gelman & Jessica Hullman & Christopher Wlezien & George Elliott Morris, 2020. "Information, incentives, and goals in election forecasts," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 15(5), pages 863-880, September.
- Deb, Rahul & Mitchell, Matthew & Pai, Mallesh M., 2022.
"(Bad) reputation in relational contracting,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(2), May.
- Pai, Mallesh & Deb, Rahul & Mitchell, Matthew, 2020. "(Bad) Reputation in Relational Contracting," CEPR Discussion Papers 14408, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Lukyanov, Georgy, 2023. "Reputation for competence in a cheap-talk setting," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(3), pages 285-294.
- Rajiv Vohra & Francisco Espinosa & Debraj Ray, 2021. "A Principal-Agent Relationship with No Advantage to Commitment," Working Papers 2021-003, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Rahul Deb & Matthew Mitchell & Mallesh Pai, 2019. "Our distrust is very expensive," Working Papers tecipa-632, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Dell’Era, Michele, 2020. "Talking to influence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 192(C).
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- C53 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Forecasting and Prediction Models; Simulation Methods
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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