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Evaluating Strategic Forecasters

Author

Listed:
  • Rahul Deb
  • Mallesh Pai
  • Maher Said

Abstract

Motivated by the question of how one should evaluate professional election forecasters, we study a novel dynamic mechanism design problem without transfers. A principal who wishes to hire only high quality forecasters is faced with an agent of unknown quality. The agent privately observes signals about a publicly observable future event, and may strategically misrepresent information to inflate the principal's perception of his quality. We show that the optimal deterministic mechanism is simple and easy to implement in practice: it evaluates a single, optimally timed prediction. We study the generality of this result and its robustness to randomization and noncommitment.

Suggested Citation

  • Rahul Deb & Mallesh Pai & Maher Said, 2017. "Evaluating Strategic Forecasters," Working Papers tecipa-578, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-578
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Cipullo, Davide & Reslow, André, 2019. "Biased Forecasts to Affect Voting Decisions? The Brexit Case," Working Paper Series 364, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden).
    2. Dirk Bergemann & Tan Gan & Yingkai Li, 2023. "Managing Persuasion Robustly: The Optimality of Quota Rules," Papers 2310.10024, arXiv.org.
    3. Lukyanov, Georgy, 2023. "Reputation for competence in a cheap-talk setting," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(3), pages 285-294.
    4. repec:cup:judgdm:v:15:y:2020:i:5:p:863-880 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Deb, Rahul & Mitchell, Matthew & Pai, Mallesh M., 2022. "(Bad) reputation in relational contracting," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(2), May.
    6. Aleksei Smirnov & Egor Starkov, 2019. "Timing of predictions in dynamic cheap talk: experts vs. quacks," ECON - Working Papers 334, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    7. Dell’Era, Michele, 2020. "Talking to influence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 192(C).
    8. Rajiv Vohra & Francisco Espinosa & Debraj Ray, 2021. "A Principal-Agent Relationship with No Advantage to Commitment," Working Papers 2021-003, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    9. Rahul Deb & Matthew Mitchell & Mallesh Pai, 2019. "Our distrust is very expensive," Working Papers tecipa-632, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    10. Yingkai Li & Jonathan Libgober, 2023. "Optimal Scoring for Dynamic Information Acquisition," Papers 2310.19147, arXiv.org.
    11. Andrew Gelman & Jessica Hullman & Christopher Wlezien & George Elliott Morris, 2020. "Information, incentives, and goals in election forecasts," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 15(5), pages 863-880, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    dynamic mechanism design; mechanism design without transfers; forecasting; learning; election predictions.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law

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