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Test-Optional Admissions

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  • Wouter Dessein
  • Alex Frankel
  • Navin Kartik

Abstract

The Covid-19 pandemic has accelerated the trend of many colleges moving to test-optional, and in some cases test-blind, admissions policies. A frequent claim is that by not seeing standardized test scores, a college is able to admit a student body that it prefers, such as one with more diversity. But how can observing less information allow a college to improve its decisions? We argue that test-optional policies may be driven by social pressure on colleges' admission decisions. We propose a model of college admissions in which a college disagrees with society on which students should be admitted. We show how the college can use a test-optional policy to reduce its "disagreement cost" with society, regardless of whether this results in a preferred student pool. We discuss which students either benefit from or are harmed by a test-optional policy. In an application, we study how a ban on using race in admissions may result in more colleges going test optional or test blind.

Suggested Citation

  • Wouter Dessein & Alex Frankel & Navin Kartik, 2023. "Test-Optional Admissions," Papers 2304.07551, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2304.07551
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    References listed on IDEAS

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