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Early Admission at Selective Colleges

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Author Info

  • Christopher Avery

    (Harvard University)

  • Jonathan Levin

    ()
    (Stanford University)

Abstract

Early admissions is widely used by selective colleges and universities. We identify some basic facts about early admissions policies, including the admissions advantage enjoyed by early applicants and patterns in application behavior, and propose a game theoretic model that matches these facts. The key feature of the model is that colleges want to admit students who are enthusiastic about attending, and early admissions programs give students an opportunity to signal this enthusiasm.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research in its series Discussion Papers with number 08-031.

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Date of creation: Mar 2009
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Handle: RePEc:sip:dpaper:08-031

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Keywords: Game Theory; Early Admission; Education;

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References

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  1. Hector Chade & Greg Lewis & Lones Smith, 2006. "The College Admissions Problem Under Uncertainty," 2006 Meeting Papers 125, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  2. Avery, Christopher & Fairbanks, Andrew & Zeckhauser, Richard, 2001. "What Worms for the Early Bird: Early Admissions at Elite Colleges," Working Paper Series rwp01-049, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
  3. Kim, Matthew, 2010. "Early decision and financial aid competition among need-blind colleges and universities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(5-6), pages 410-420, June.
  4. Sam-Ho Lee, 2009. "Jumping The Curse: Early Contracting With Private Information In University Admissions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 50(1), pages 1-38, 02.
  5. Roth, Alvin E & Xing, Xiaolin, 1994. "Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 992-1044, September.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Kushnir, Alexey, 2013. "Harmful signaling in matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 209-218.
  2. Chapman, Gabrielle & Dickert-Conlin, Stacy, 2012. "Applying early decision: Student and college incentives and outcomes," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 749-763.
  3. Mustafa Afacan, 2013. "The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 53(1), pages 139-151, May.
  4. Janine Balter & Michela Rancan & Olena Senyuta, 2014. "Truncation in the Matching Markets and Market Ineffciency," RSCAS Working Papers 2014/04, European University Institute.
  5. Chao Fu, 2012. "Equilibrium Tuition, Applications, Admissions and Enrollment in the College Market," Working Papers 2012-002, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
  6. Van Kolpin & Mark Stater, 2013. "The Real Deal? Information Asymmetries and Tuition Discounting in Higher Education," Review of Economic Analysis, Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis, vol. 5(2), pages 190-212, December.
  7. Bai, Chong-en & Chi, Wei & Xiaoye, Qian, 2013. "Do College Entrance Examination Scores Predict Undergraduate GPAs? A Tale of Two Universities," MPRA Paper 48731, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Chao Fu, 2012. "Equilibrium Tuition, Applications, Admissions and Enrollment in the College Market," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-013, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  9. Dennis Epple & Richard Romano & Sinan Sarpça & Holger Sieg, 2013. "The U.S. Market for Higher Education: A General Equilibrium Analysis of State and Private Colleges and Public Funding Policies," NBER Working Papers 19298, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Hurwitz, Michael, 2011. "The impact of legacy status on undergraduate admissions at elite colleges and universities," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 480-492, June.
  11. Alvin E. Roth, 2010. "Marketplace Institutions Related to the Timing of Transactions," NBER Working Papers 16556, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Chen, Wei-Cheng & Kao, Yi-Cheng, 2014. "Simultaneous screening and college admissions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 296-298.

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