Early Admissions at Selective Colleges
AbstractEarly admissions are widely used by selective colleges and universities. We identify some basic facts about early admissions policies, including the admissions advantage enjoyed by early applicants and patterns in application behavior, and propose a game-theoretic model that matches these facts. The key feature of the model is that colleges want to admit students who are enthusiastic about attending, and early admissions programs give students an opportunity to signal this enthusiasm. (JEL C78, I23)
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 100 (2010)
Issue (Month): 5 (December)
Other versions of this item:
- Christopher Avery & Jonathan Levin, 2009. "Early Admission at Selective Colleges," Discussion Papers 08-031, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Christopher Avery & Jonathan D. Levin, 2009. "Early Admissions at Selective Colleges," NBER Working Papers 14844, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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