Affirmative Action: One Size Does Not Fit All
AbstractThis paper identifies a new reason for giving preferences to the disadvantaged using a model of contests. There are two forces at work: the effort effect working against giving preferences and the selection effect working for them. When education is costly and easy to obtain (as in the U.S.), the selection effect dominates. When education is heavily subsidized and limited in supply (as in India), preferences are welfare reducing. The model also shows that unequal treatment of identical agents can be welfare improving, providing insights into when the counterintuitive policy of rationing educational access to some subgroups is welfare improving.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 19546.
Date of creation: Oct 2013
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- Krishna, Kala & Tarasov, Alexander, 2013. "Affirmative Action: One Size Does Not Fit All," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 407, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- I23 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Higher Education; Research Institutions
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