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A Theory of Affirmative Action in College Admissions

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Author Info
Qiang Fu

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Abstract

To address the issue of when minority and nonminority candidates compete for admissions to a college, we show that an academic quality--oriented college maximizes the test score of its incoming class by adopting an admissions rule that favors the minority. Such a "handicapping" rule increases competition and induces candidates to invest more in educational attainment. These results reconcile the often-assumed conflicts between diversity and academic quality. However, we also show that the non-minority responds to the affirmative action admissions more aggressively, which tends to widen the racial test score gap. (JEL H0, J7) Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/ei/cbj020
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Economic Inquiry.

Volume (Year): 44 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Pages: 420-428
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Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:44:y:2006:i:3:p:420-428

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Keywords:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H0 - Public Economics - - General
J7 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Pastine, Ivan & Pastine, Tuvana, 2006. "Politician Preferences and Caps on Political Lobbying," CEPR Discussion Papers 5913, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Jörg Franke, 2007. "Does Affirmative Action Reduce Effort Incentives? A Contest Game Analysis," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 711.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-19.

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