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Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Benjamin Bental & Bruno Deffains & Dominique Demougin, 2012. "Credibility and Monitoring: Outsourcing as a Commitment Device," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(1), pages 31-52, March.
  2. Anna Maria Cristina Menichini, 2003. "Separation of functions, Collusion and Supervisors Financial Participation," CSEF Working Papers 109, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  3. Letina, Igor & Liu, Shuo & Netzer, Nick, 2020. "Delegating performance evaluation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(2), May.
  4. De Chiara, Alessandro & Livio, Luca, 2017. "The threat of corruption and the optimal supervisory task," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 172-186.
  5. Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée, 2006. "Incentives For Corruptible Auditors In The Absence Of Commitment," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(2), pages 269-291, June.
  6. William A. Wagstaff, 2019. "Organizing evaluation: Assessing combat leadership quality," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(2), pages 132-155, April.
  7. Mohamed Belhaj & Nataliya Klimenko, 2012. "Optimal Preventive Bank Supervision Combining Random Audits and Continuous Intervention," AMSE Working Papers 1201, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
  8. Jiancai Pi, 2011. "Relational Incentives in Chinese Family Firms," Panoeconomicus, Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia, vol. 58(4), pages 511-524, December.
  9. Marisa Ratto & Wendelin Schnedler, 2003. "Too few cooks spoil the broth," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 03/090, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
  10. Arnoud W.A. Boot & Jonathan R. Macey, 1999. "Objectivity, Proximity and Adaptability in Corporate Governance," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 266, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  11. Peter-J. Jost, 2023. "Auditing versus monitoring and the role of commitment," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 463-496, June.
  12. repec:awi:wpaper:0468 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Franzoni, Luigi Alberto, 1998. "Independent auditors as fiscal gatekeepers1," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 365-384, December.
  14. Aaron Finkle, "undated". "Obstructive Monitoring," Working Papers 14-05, Davidson College, Department of Economics.
  15. Lang, Matthias & Wambach, Achim, 2013. "The fog of fraud – Mitigating fraud by strategic ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 255-275.
  16. Asseyer, Andreas, 2018. "Optimal monitoring in dynamic procurement contracts," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 222-252.
  17. Hindriks, Jean & Keen, Michael & Muthoo, Abhinay, 1999. "Corruption, extortion and evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 395-430, December.
  18. Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée & Troy J. Scott, 2015. "Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(4), pages 872-890, October.
  19. Francesc Dilmé & Daniel F Garrett, 2019. "Residual Deterrence," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 17(5), pages 1654-1686.
  20. Giebe, Thomas & Gürtler, Oliver, 2012. "Optimal contracts for lenient supervisors," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 403-420.
  21. Roland Strausz, 2001. "Mitigating Non-Contractability with Interim Randomization," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 157(2), pages 231-245, June.
  22. Strausz, Roland, 2006. "Buried in paperwork: Excessive reporting in organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(4), pages 460-470, August.
  23. Silvia Dominguez-Martinez & Randolph Sloof & Ferdinand von Siemens, 2010. "Monitoring your Friends, not your Foes: Strategic Ignorance and the Delegation of Real Authority," CESifo Working Paper Series 3172, CESifo.
  24. Dequiedt, Vianney & Martimort, David, 2004. "Delegated monitoring versus arm's-length contracting," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(7), pages 951-981, September.
  25. Barbos, Andrei, 2019. "Dynamic contracts with random monitoring," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 1-16.
  26. Chiappinelli, Olga, 2020. "Political corruption in the execution of public contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 116-140.
  27. Shrestha, Asheem & Chan, Toong-Khuan & Aibinu, Ajibade A. & Chen, Chuan, 2017. "Efficient risk transfer in PPP wastewater treatment projects," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 132-140.
  28. Marisa Agostini & Giovanni Favero, 2012. "Accounting fraud, business failure and creative auditing: A micro-analysis of the strange case of Sunbeam Corp," Working Papers 12, Venice School of Management - Department of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia, revised Mar 2013.
  29. Dequiedt, V. & Geourjon, A.-M. & Rota-Graziosi, G., 2012. "Mutual supervision in preshipment inspection programs," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 282-291.
  30. Arnoud W.A. Boot & Jonathan R. Macey, 1998. "Objectivity, Control and Adaptability in Corporate Governance," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 98-064/2, Tinbergen Institute.
  31. Mitusch, Kay, 2006. "Non-commitment in performance evaluation and the problem of information distortions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(4), pages 507-525, August.
  32. Roland Strausz, 2006. "Interim Information in Long‐Term Contracts," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(4), pages 1041-1067, December.
  33. Ratto, Marisa & Schnedler, Wendelin, 2005. "Division of Labour and Directed Production," IZA Discussion Papers 1669, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  34. Albert Park & Minggao Shen, 2002. "A Refinancing Model of Decentralization with Empirical Evidence from China," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 461, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  35. Oliver Gürtler & Christine Harbring, 2010. "Feedback in Tournaments under Commitment Problems: Experimental Evidence," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(3), pages 771-810, September.
  36. Saak, Alexander E., "undated". "Delegation of Monitoring, Transparency, and Reputation," 2015 AAEA & WAEA Joint Annual Meeting, July 26-28, San Francisco, California 205682, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
  37. Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée & Sungho Yun, 2010. "Bribery versus extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(1), pages 179-198, March.
  38. Landa, Dimitri & Le Bihan, Patrick, 2015. "Oversight and Hierarchies," IAST Working Papers 15-33, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST).
  39. Andreas Asseyer, "undated". "Optimal monitoring in dynamic procurement contracts," BDPEMS Working Papers 2015002, Berlin School of Economics.
  40. Saak, Alexander E., 2016. "Delegation of quality control in value chains," IFPRI discussion papers 1526, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
  41. Chongwoo Choe & Iain Fraser, 1999. "Compliance Monitoring and Agri‐Environmental Policy," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(3), pages 468-487, September.
  42. repec:awi:wpaper:0421 is not listed on IDEAS
  43. Schottmüller-Einwag, Ute, 2017. "Theoretische Erklärungsansätze für die Entsprechenserklärungen zu Abfindungen für Vorstandsmitglieder [Theoretical explanation approaches for the declarations of conformity regarding severance paym," Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics 7/2017, University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics.
  44. Felli, Leonardo & Hortala-Vallve, Rafael, 2016. "Collusion, Blackmail and Whistle-Blowing," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 11(3), pages 279-312, October.
  45. Anna Maria C. Menichini, 2008. "Third Parties, Information Disclosure And Monitoring Incentives," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 55(1), pages 31-50, February.
  46. Annamaria Menichini & Peter Simmons, 2001. "Are two investors better than one?," CSEF Working Papers 71, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  47. Ling‐Chieh Kung & Ying‐Ju Chen, 2011. "Monitoring the market or the salesperson? The value of information in a multilayer supply chain," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 58(8), pages 743-762, December.
  48. Vianney Dequiedt & Anne-Marie Geourjon & Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, 2011. "Mutual Supervision in Preshipment Inspection Programs," CERDI Working papers halshs-00554316, HAL.
  49. Linus Wilson, 2014. "Managerial ownership with rent-seeking employees," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 375-394, August.
  50. Guy David & Philip A. Saynisch & Aaron Smith-McLallen, 2016. "The Inner Workings of the Patient Centered Medical Home Model," NBER Working Papers 22429, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  51. Andrei Barbos, 2022. "Optimal contracts with random monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 51(1), pages 119-154, March.
  52. An, Weihua & Kweon, Yesola, 2017. "Do higher government wages induce less corruption? Cross-country panel evidence," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 39(5), pages 809-826.
  53. David Rahman, 2012. "But Who Will Monitor the Monitor?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(6), pages 2767-2797, October.
  54. Tao Zhang & Lishi Gu & Jenny Jing Wang, 2023. "State‐owned capital and corporate social responsibility of private‐holding companies: evidence from China," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 63(S1), pages 1101-1120, April.
  55. Saak, Alexander E., "undated". "The Value of Delegated Quality Control and Market Size with an Application to Kyrgyzstan Dairy," 2016 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Boston, Massachusetts 235707, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
  56. Che, Xiaogang & Huang, Yangguang & Zhang, Le, 2021. "Supervisory efficiency and collusion in a multiple-agent hierarchy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 425-442.
  57. Alex Gershkov & Eyal Winter, 2015. "Formal versus Informal Monitoring in Teams," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 27-44, May.
  58. Alireza Fallah & Michael I. Jordan, 2023. "Contract Design With Safety Inspections," Papers 2311.02537, arXiv.org.
  59. Scholz, Julia, 2008. "Auswirkungen vertikaler Kollusionsprobleme auf die vertragliche Ausgestaltung von Kreditverkäufen," Discussion Papers in Business Administration 4581, University of Munich, Munich School of Management.
  60. Moffett, Maurice L. & Morgan, Robert O. & Ashton, Carol M., 2005. "Strategic opportunities in the oversight of the U.S. hospital accreditation system," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 109-115, December.
  61. Vlaicu, Razvan & Whalley, Alexander, 2016. "Hierarchical accountability in government," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 85-99.
  62. Marina Halac & Andrea Prat, 2016. "Managerial Attention and Worker Performance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(10), pages 3104-3132, October.
  63. Kuhn, Michael & Siciliani, Luigi, 2013. "Manipulation and auditing of public sector contracts," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 251-267.
  64. Khalil, Fahad & Lawarree, Jacques, 2001. "Catching the agent on the wrong foot: ex post choice of monitoring," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 327-347, December.
  65. Leif Sörensen & Jan Schlüter, 2021. "How do contract types and incentives influence driver behavior?−An analysis of the Kigali bus network," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 8(1), pages 1-11, December.
  66. Alexander E. Saak, 2017. "The Value of Delegated Quality Control," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(2), pages 309-335, June.
  67. Annamaria Menichini, 2000. "Third parties as an incentive to comply," CSEF Working Papers 41, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 01 Jan 2006.
  68. Prat, Andrea & Halac, Marina, 2014. "Managerial Attention and Worker Engagement," CEPR Discussion Papers 10035, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  69. Tan, Teck Yong, 2023. "Optimal transparency of monitoring capability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
  70. Peter Achim & Jan Knoepfle, 2025. "The Tension between Trust and Oversight in Long-term Relationships," Papers 2504.02696, arXiv.org.
  71. Roland Strausz, "undated". "Mitigating Non-contractible actions by randomness," Papers 003, Departmental Working Papers.
  72. Music, Kasim & Salzmann, Christian, 2020. "Why biased agencies could be the best monitors," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
  73. A. Menichini & P. Simmons, "undated". "Can Liars Ever Prosper," Discussion Papers 02/10, Department of Economics, University of York.
  74. Ratto Marisa & Schnedler Wendelin, 2008. "Too Few Cooks Spoil the Broth: Division of Labor and Directed Production," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-19, August.
  75. Hindriks, Jean, 1999. "On the incompatibility between revenue maximisation and tax progressivity1," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 123-140, March.
  76. Dittmann, Ingolf, 1999. "How reliable should auditors be?: optimal monitoring in principal-agent relationships," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 523-546, September.
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