The Inner Workings of the Patient Centered Medical Home Model
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References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Zhang, Xue & Sweetman, Arthur, 2018. "Blended capitation and incentives: Fee codes inside and outside the capitated basket," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 16-29.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- I1 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health
- I10 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - General
- I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
- L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-HEA-2016-08-14 (Health Economics)
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