Division of Labour and Directed Production
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Ratto, Marisa & Schnedler, Wendelin, 2005. "Division of Labour and Directed Production," IZA Discussion Papers 1669, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
References listed on IDEAS
- Itoh, Hideshi, 1992. "Cooperation in Hierarchical Organizations: An Incentive Perspective," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(2), pages 321-345, April.
- Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972.
"Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
- Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, 1971. "Production, Information Costs and Economic Organizations," UCLA Economics Working Papers 10A, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, 1994.
"The Division of Labor, Coordination Costs, and Knowledge,"
NBER Chapters, in: Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with Special Reference to Education, Third Edition, pages 299-322,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, 1992. "The Division of Labor, Coordination Costs, and Knowledge," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 107(4), pages 1137-1160.
- Becker, G.S. & Murphy, K.M., 1991. "The Division of Labor, Coordination Costs, and Knowledge," University of Chicago - Economics Research Center 92-5, Chicago - Economics Research Center.
- Becker, Gary S. & Murphy, Kevin M., 1992. "The Division of Labor, Coordination Costs, and Knowledge," Working Papers 79, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
- Canice Prendergast, 2003. "The Limits of Bureaucratic Efficiency," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(5), pages 929-958, October.
- Roland Strausz, 1997.
"Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 64(3), pages 337-357.
- Strausz, R.G., 1995. "Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship," Discussion Paper 1995-60, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Patrick Bolton & Mathias Dewatripont, 1994.
"The Firm as a Communication Network,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(4), pages 809-839.
- Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Bolton, 1994. "The firm as a communication network," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9595, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Bolton, 1996. "The firm as a communication network," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9597, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Bolton, 2004. "The firm as a communication network," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9599, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Itoh, Hideshi, 1991. "Incentives to Help in Multi-agent Situations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 611-636, May.
- Mathias Dewatripont & Ian Jewitt & Jean Tirole, 1999.
"The Economics of Career Concerns, Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 199-217.
- Mathias Dewatripont & Ian Jewitt & Jean Tirole, 1999. "The economics of career concerns, part II: Application to missions and accountability of Government agencies," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/170042, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Susan Athey & John Roberts, 2001. "Organizational Design: Decision Rights and Incentive Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 200-205, May.
- Wendelin Schnedler, 2003.
"On the Prudence of Rewarding A While Hoping for B,"
The Centre for Market and Public Organisation
03/067, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
- Schnedler, Wendelin, 2003. "On the Prudence of Rewarding A While Hoping For B," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 7/2003, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Schnedler, Wendelin, 2003. "On the Prudence of Rewarding A While Hoping for B," IZA Discussion Papers 765, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- George Baker, 2002. "Distortion and Risk in Optimal Incentive Contracts," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 37(4), pages 728-751.
- Gibbons, Robert & Murphy, Kevin J, 1992.
"Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 468-505, June.
- Gibbons, R. & Murphy, K.J., 1990. "Optimal Incentive Contracts In The Presence Of Career Concerns: Theory And Evidence," Working papers 563, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1991. "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 3792, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Murphy, K.J. & Gibbons, R., 1990. "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns : Theory and Evidence," Papers 90-09, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
- Lindbeck, Assar & Snower, Dennis J, 2000.
"Multitask Learning and the Reorganization of Work: From Tayloristic to Holistic Organization,"
Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 353-376, July.
- Lindbeck, Assar & Snower, Dennis J., 1999. "Multi-Task Learning and the Reorganization of Work. From Tayloristic to Holistic Organization," IZA Discussion Papers 39, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- repec:rus:hseeco:124059 is not listed on IDEAS
- Simon Burgess & Marisa Ratto, 2003. "The Role of Incentives in the Public Sector: Issues and Evidence," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 19(2), pages 285-300, Summer.
- Jean Tirole, 1985. "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies," Working papers 363, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Taylor, Frederick Winslow, 1911. "The Principles of Scientific Management," History of Economic Thought Books, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, number taylor1911.
- Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
- Strausz, R.G., 1995. "Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship," Other publications TiSEM 7b745873-4687-47ee-afc3-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Simon Burgess & Marisa Ratto, 2003. "The Role of Incentives in the Public Sector: Issues and Evidence," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 03/071, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- repec:awi:wpaper:0421 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:awi:wpaper:0468 is not listed on IDEAS
- Ratto Marisa & Schnedler Wendelin, 2008. "Too Few Cooks Spoil the Broth: Division of Labor and Directed Production," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-19, August.
- Jed DeVaro & Oliver Gürtler, 2016. "Strategic Shirking: A Theoretical Analysis Of Multitasking And Specialization," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 57(2), pages 507-532, May.
- Dietrichson, Jens, 2013. "Coordination Incentives, Performance Measurement and Resource Allocation in Public Sector Organizations," Working Papers 2013:26, Lund University, Department of Economics.
- Simon Burgess & Carol Propper & Marisa Ratto & Emma Tominey, 2017.
"Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from a Government Agency,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(605), pages 117-141, October.
- Simon Burgess & Carol Propper & Marisa Ratto & Emma Tominey, 2004. "Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from a Government Agency," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 04/103, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
- Simon M. Burgess & Carol Propper & Marisa Ratto & Emma Tominey, 2017. "Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from a Government Agency," Post-Print hal-01651132, HAL.
- Simon Burgess & Carol Propper & Marisa Ratto & Emma Tominey, 2011. "Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from a Government Agency," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 11/265, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
- Burgess, Simon & Propper, Carol & Ratto, Marisa & Tominey, Emma, 2012. "Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from a Government Agency," CEPR Discussion Papers 9071, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Burgess, Simon & Propper, Carol & Ratto, Marisa & Tominey, Emma, 2012. "Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from a Government Agency," IZA Discussion Papers 6738, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Meagher, Kieron & Prasad, Suraj, 2016. "Career concerns and team talent," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 1-17.
- Oddvar M. Kaarbøe & Trond E. Olsen, 2008.
"Distorted Performance Measures and Dynamic Incentives,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(1), pages 149-183, March.
- Kaarbøe, Oddvar M. & Olsen, Trond E., 2004. "Distorted Performance Measures and Dynamic Incentives," Discussion Papers 2004/21, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
- Kaarbøe, Oddvar M. & Olsen, Trond E., 2006. "Distorted Performance Measures and Dynamic Incentives," Working Papers in Economics 07/06, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
- Meyer, Margaret A. & Olsen, Trond E. & Torsvik, Gaute, 1996.
"Limited intertemporal commitment and job design,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 401-417, December.
- Trond Olsen & Gaute Torsvik, 1994. "Limited Intertemporal Commitment and Job Design," CESifo Working Paper Series 77, CESifo.
- Meyer, M.A. & Olsen, T.E. & Torsvik, G., 1995. "Limited Intertemporal Commitment and Job Design," Economics Papers 102, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- Makris, Miltiadis, 2009.
"Incentives for motivated agents under an administrative constraint,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 428-440, August.
- Miltiadis Makris, 2006. "Incentives for Motivated Agents under an Administrative Constraint," Discussion Papers 0601, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
- Miltiadis Makris, 2009. "Incentives for Motivated Agents under an Administrative Constraint," Post-Print hal-00683158, HAL.
- Balmaceda, Felipe, 2016.
"Optimal task assignments,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 1-18.
- Felipe Balmaceda, 2014. "Optimal Task Assignments," Working Papers 54, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad Diego Portales.
- Koch Alexander K & Morgenstern Albrecht, 2010.
"Coordination under the Shadow of Career Concerns,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-40, March.
- Koch, Alexander K. & Morgenstern, Albrecht, 2009. "Coordination under the Shadow of Career Concerns," IZA Discussion Papers 4039, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Balmaceda, Felipe, 2018. "Optimal task assignments with loss-averse agents," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 1-26.
- Kuhn, Michael & Siciliani, Luigi, 2013. "Manipulation and auditing of public sector contracts," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 251-267.
- Carolyn J. Heinrich & Gerald Marschke, 2010. "Incentives and their dynamics in public sector performance management systems," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(1), pages 183-208.
- Hakenes, Hendrik & Katolnik, Svetlana, 2017. "On the incentive effects of job rotation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 424-441.
- Propper, Carol & Sutton, Matt & Whitnall, Carolyn & Windmeijer, Frank, 2010.
"Incentives and targets in hospital care: Evidence from a natural experiment,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(3-4), pages 318-335, April.
- Carol Propper & Matt Sutton & Carolyn Whitnall & Frank Windmeijer, 2008. "Incentives and Targets in Hospital Care: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 08/205, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
- Pouliakas, Konstantinos & Theodossiou, Ioannis, 2012. "Rewarding carrots and crippling sticks: Eliciting employee preferences for the optimal incentive design," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 1247-1265.
- repec:dau:papers:123456789/12197 is not listed on IDEAS
- Shrestha, Asheem & Chan, Toong-Khuan & Aibinu, Ajibade A. & Chen, Chuan, 2017. "Efficient risk transfer in PPP wastewater treatment projects," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 132-140.
- Fleckinger, Pierre & Martimort, David & Roux, Nicolas, 2023. "Should They Compete or Should They Cooperate? The View of Agency Theory," TSE Working Papers 23-1421, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jan 2024.
- Marisa Ratto & Wendelin Schnedler, 2003.
"Too few cooks spoil the broth,"
The Centre for Market and Public Organisation
03/090, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
- Marisa Ratto & Wendelin Schnedler, 2004. "Too Few Cooks Spoil The Broth," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2004 154, Royal Economic Society.
- Evangelia Chalioti, 2015. "Team Production, Endogenous Learning about Abilities and Career Concerns," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2020, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
More about this item
Keywords
hidden action; moral hazard; specialisation; job design;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bri:cmpowp:05/126. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cmbriuk.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.