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Citations for "Rationalization and Incomplete Information"

by P. Battigalli & M. Siniscalchi

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  1. Hu, Tai-Wei, 2007. "On p-rationalizability and approximate common certainty of rationality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 379-391, September.
  2. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2009. "Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 76(4), pages 1175-1204.
  3. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2009. "Robust Virtual Implementation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000155, David K. Levine.
  4. Arieli, Itai, 2010. "Rationalizability in continuous games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(5), pages 912-924, September.
  5. Roger Guesnerie & Pedro Jara-Moroni, 2011. "Expectational coordination in simple economic contexts," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 205-246, June.
  6. Stephen Morris & Dirk Bergemann, 2004. "Robust Mechanism Design," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm380, Yale School of Management.
  7. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1561, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  8. Brandenburger, Adam & Friedenberg, Amanda, 2008. "Intrinsic correlation in games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 141(1), pages 28-67, July.
  9. Jonathan Weinstein & Muhamet Yildiz, 2004. "Finite-Order Implications of Any Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000065, David K. Levine.
  10. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2008. "Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1666R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jan 2010.
  11. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2011. "Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000054, David K. Levine.
  12. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Morris, Stephen, 2006. "Topologies on types," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(3), pages 275-309, September.
  13. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2007. "Interactive epistemology in games with payoff uncertainty," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(4), pages 165-184, December.
  14. Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2005. "The Canonical Type Space for Interdependent Preferences," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 666156000000000635, www.najecon.org.
  15. Artemov, Georgy & Kunimoto, Takashi & Serrano, Roberto, 2013. "Robust virtual implementation: Toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 424-447.
  16. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1628, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  17. Oyama, Daisuke & Tercieux, Olivier, 2010. "Robust equilibria under non-common priors," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 752-784, March.
  18. Pierpaolo Battigalli, 2006. "Rationalization In Signaling Games: Theory And Applications," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 8(01), pages 67-93.
  19. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "Belief Free Incomplete Information Games," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001569, UCLA Department of Economics.
  20. Georgy Artemov & Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Robust Virtual Implementation with Incomplete Information: Toward a Reinterpretation of the Wilson Doctrine," Working Papers 2007-6, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  21. Liu, Qingmin, 2009. "On redundant types and Bayesian formulation of incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 2115-2145, September.
  22. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011. "Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000187, David K. Levine.
  23. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000116, UCLA Department of Economics.
  24. Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Faruk Gul, 2007. "The Canonical Space for Behavioral Types," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000345, UCLA Department of Economics.
  25. Weinstein, Jonathan & Yildiz, Muhamet, 2011. "Sensitivity of equilibrium behavior to higher-order beliefs in nice games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 288-300, May.
  26. Weinstein, Jonathan & Yildiz, Muhamet, 2007. "Impact of higher-order uncertainty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 200-212, July.
  27. Tsakas Elias, 2012. "Rational belief hierarchies," Research Memorandum 004, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  28. Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz & Morris, Stephen, 2011. "The robustness of robust implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 2093-2104, September.
  29. Amanda Friedenberg, 2006. "Can Hidden Variables Explain Correlation? (joint with Adam Brandenburger)," Theory workshop papers 815595000000000005, UCLA Department of Economics.
  30. Itai Arieli, 2008. "Rationalizability in Continuous Games," Discussion Paper Series dp495, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  31. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Alfredo Di Tillio & Edoardo Grillo & Antonio Penta, 2008. "Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 340, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  32. Barry O'Neill, 2006. "Nuclear Weapons and National Prestige," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1560, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.