Quotient Spaces of Boundedly Rational Types
By identifying types whose low-order beliefs, up to level l(sub i), about the state of nature coincide, we obtain quotient type spaces that are typically smaller than the original ones, preserve basic topological properties, and allow standard equilibrium analysis even under bounded reasoning. Our Bayesian Nash (l(sub i, l sub _i)-equilibria capture players’ inability to distinguish types belonging to the same equivalence class. The case with uncertainty about the vector of levels (l(sub i, l sub _i) is also analyzed. Two examples illustrate the constructions. JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D03, D83
|Date of creation:||20 Sep 2011|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014|
Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Email: |
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Carlsson, H. & van Damme, E.E.C., 1990.
"Global games and equilibrium selection,"
1990-52, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Hans Carlsson & Eric van Damme, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001088, David K. Levine.
- Carlsson, H. & Van Damme, E., 1990. "Global Games And Equilibrium Selection," Papers 9052, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- Carlsson, H. & van Damme, E.E.C., 1993. "Global games and equilibrium selection," Other publications TiSEM 49a54f00-dcec-4fc1-9488-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Muhamet Yildiz & Jonathan Weinsten, 2004.
"Impact of higher-order uncertainty,"
Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings
157, Econometric Society.
- Camille Cornand & Frank Heinemann, 2014.
"Measuring agents’ reaction to private and public information in games with strategic complementarities,"
Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(1), pages 61-77, March.
- Camille Cornand & Frank Heinemann, 2014. "Measuring Agents' Reaction to Private and Public Information in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Working Papers halshs-00925018, HAL.
- Camille Cornand & Frank Heinemann, 2010. "Measuring Agents' Reaction to Private and Public Information in Games with Strategic Complementarities," CESifo Working Paper Series 2947, CESifo Group Munich.
- Camille Cornand & Frank Heinemann, 2014. "Measuring agents' reaction to private and public information in games with strategic complementarities," Post-Print halshs-00811951, HAL.
- Colin F. Camerer & Teck-Hua Ho & Juin-Kuan Chong, 2004. "A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 119(3), pages 861-898.
- Tomasz Strzalecki, "undated".
"Depth of Reasoning and Higher Order Beliefs,"
8334, Harvard University OpenScholar.
- Philippe Jehiel & Frédéric Koessler, 2006.
"Revisiting Games of Incomplete Information with Analogy-Based Expectations,"
122247000000000252, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Jehiel, Philippe & Koessler, Frédéric, 2008. "Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 533-557, March.
- Philippe Jehiel & Frederic Koessler, 2005. "Revisiting Games of Incomplete Information with Analogy-Based Expectations," THEMA Working Papers 2005-04, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Philippe Jehiel & Frédéric Koessler, 2008. "Revisiting Games of Incomplete Information with Analogy-Based Expectations," Post-Print halshs-00754297, HAL.
- Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2003. "Behavioral Game Theory. Experiments in Strategic Interaction: Colin F. Camerer, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 2003, p. 550, Price $65.00/[UK pound]42.95, ISBN 0-691-09039-4," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 32(6), pages 717-720, December.
- Uwe Dulleck, 2002.
"The e-mail game revisited - Modeling rough inductive reasoning,"
Vienna Economics Papers
0211, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Uwe Dulleck, 2007. "The E-Mail Game Revisited — Modeling Rough Inductive Reasoning," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 9(02), pages 323-339.
- Jonathan Weinstein & Muhamet Yildiz, 2007. "A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(2), pages 365-400, 03.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris, 2006.
"Interim Correlated Rationalizability,"
122247000000001188, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Ronald Fagin & Joseph Y. Halpern & Yoram Moses & Moshe Y. Vardi, 2003. "Reasoning About Knowledge," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262562006, September.
- Stahl, Dale II & Wilson, Paul W., 1994. "Experimental evidence on players' models of other players," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 309-327, December.
- Willemien Kets, 2012. "Bounded Reasoning and Higher-Order Uncertainty," Discussion Papers 1547, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1539. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Fran Walker)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.