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Citations for "Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed"

by D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine

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  1. Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2005. "When is Reputation Bad," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000016, David K. Levine.
  2. Kanagaretnam, Kiridaran & Mestelman, Stuart & Khalid Nainar, S.M. & Shehata, Mohamed, 2012. "The impact of empowering investors on trust and trustworthiness," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 566-577.
  3. Martin Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2004. "Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000086, UCLA Department of Economics.
  4. Mehmet Ekmekci & Olivier Gossner & Andrea Wilson, 2010. "Impermanent Types and Permanent Reputations," Discussion Papers 1511, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. Luciano Andreozzi, 2004. "Rewarding Policemen Increases Crime. Another Surprising Result from the Inspection Game," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 69-82, October.
  6. Wiseman, Thomas, 2008. "Reputation and impermanent types," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 190-210, January.
  7. Solan, Eilon & Yariv, Leeat, 2004. "Games with espionage," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 172-199, April.
  8. Samuelson, Larry, 2001. "Introduction to the Evolution of Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 225-230, April.
  9. Swanson, Timothy & Mason, Robin, 1998. "Nonbargaining in the shadow of the law," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 121-140, June.
  10. Al-Najjar, Nabil I., 1997. "Incentive Contracts in Two-Sided Moral Hazards with Multiple Agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 174-195, May.
  11. Hausken, Kjell, 2007. "Reputation, incomplete information, and differences in patience in repeated games with multiple equilibria," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 138-144, November.
  12. Lorenzo Sacconi, 2001. "Incomplete contracts and corporate ethics: a game theoretical model under fuzzy information," LIUC Papers in Ethics, Law and Economics 91, Cattaneo University (LIUC).
  13. Hu, Ju, 2014. "Reputation in the presence of noisy exogenous learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 64-73.
  14. Xu, Hong & Chen, Jianqing & Whinston, Andrew B., 2008. "Audited reputation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(3), pages 359-362, September.
  15. Cripps, Martin W. & Dekel, Eddie & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 2005. "Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 121(2), pages 259-272, April.
  16. Monte, Daniel, 2013. "Bounded memory and permanent reputations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(5), pages 345-354.
  17. O. Gossner & N. Vieille, 2000. "Strategic Learning in Games with Symmetric Information," THEMA Working Papers 2000-27, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  18. Gottlieb, Daniel, 2014. "Imperfect memory and choice under risk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 127-158.
  19. Lu, Yang K., 2013. "Optimal policy with credibility concerns," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 2007-2032.
  20. Bagwell, Kyle, 1995. "Commitment and observability in games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 271-280.
  21. Li, Jingyuan & Liu, Yongming & Tian, Guoqiang, 2009. "A reputation strategic model of monetary policy in continuous-time," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 523-533, December.
  22. Kanagaretnam, Kiridaran & Mestelman, Stuart & Nainar, S.M. Khalid & Shehata, Mohamed, 2010. "Trust and reciprocity with transparency and repeated interactions," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 241-247, March.
  23. Modesto, Leonor & Thomas, Jonathan P., 2001. "An analysis of labour adjustment costs in unionized economies," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 475-501, September.
  24. Wiseman, Thomas, 2009. "Reputation and exogenous private learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1352-1357, May.
  25. P. L. Sacco & M. Viviani, 2006. "La responsabilita' sociale d'Impresa - prospettive teoriche nel dibattito italiano," Working Papers 578, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  26. Harasser, Andreas, 2014. "Information asymmetry and reentry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 123(2), pages 118-121.
  27. Luciano Andreozzi, 2008. "Inspection games with long-run inspectors," Department of Economics Working Papers 0821, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
  28. Sacco, Pier Luigi & Viviani, Michele, 2005. "Corporate Social Responsibility: theoretical perspectives in the Italian Debate," AICCON Working Papers 11-2005, Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit, revised 03 Feb 2007.
  29. Sorin, Sylvain, 1999. "Merging, Reputation, and Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 274-308, October.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.