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Citations for "Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed"

by D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine

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  1. Monte, Daniel, 2016. "Reputation with one-sided monitoring: Ignorance as a commitment device," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 18-21.
  2. Mehmet Ekmekci & Olivier Gossner & Andrea Wilson, 2010. "Impermanent Types and Permanent Reputations," Discussion Papers 1511, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  3. Cripps, Martin W. & Dekel, Eddie & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 2005. "Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 121(2), pages 259-272, April.
  4. Nicolas Vieille & Olivier Gossner, 2003. "Strategic learning in games with symmetric information," Post-Print hal-00464978, HAL.
  5. Hausken, Kjell, 2007. "Reputation, incomplete information, and differences in patience in repeated games with multiple equilibria," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 138-144, November.
  6. Luciano Andreozzi, 2004. "Rewarding Policemen Increases Crime. Another Surprising Result from the Inspection Game," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 69-82, October.
  7. Lorenzo Sacconi, 2001. "Incomplete contracts and corporate ethics: a game theoretical model under fuzzy information," LIUC Papers in Ethics, Law and Economics 91, Cattaneo University (LIUC).
  8. P. L. Sacco & M. Viviani, 2006. "La responsabilita' sociale d'Impresa - prospettive teoriche nel dibattito italiano," Working Papers 578, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  9. Harasser, Andreas, 2014. "Information asymmetry and reentry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 123(2), pages 118-121.
  10. Samuelson, Larry, 2001. "Introduction to the Evolution of Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 225-230, April.
  11. Martin W. Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2006. "Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000152, UCLA Department of Economics.
  12. Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2015. "Reputations in Repeated Games," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, volume 4, chapter 4, pages 165-238 Elsevier.
  13. Lu, Yang K., 2013. "Optimal policy with credibility concerns," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 2007-2032.
  14. Kyle Bagwell, 1992. "Commitment and Observability in Games," Discussion Papers 1014, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  15. Wiseman, Thomas, 2008. "Reputation and impermanent types," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 190-210, January.
  16. Modesto, Leonor & Thomas, Jonathan P., 2000. "An Analysis of Labour Adjustment Costs in Unionized Economies," IZA Discussion Papers 225, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  17. Hugonnier, Julien & Malamud, Semyon & Morellec, Erwan, 2015. "Credit market frictions and capital structure dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 1130-1158.
  18. Kanagaretnam, Kiridaran & Mestelman, Stuart & Khalid Nainar, S.M. & Shehata, Mohamed, 2012. "The impact of empowering investors on trust and trustworthiness," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 566-577.
  19. Sorin, Sylvain, 1999. "Merging, Reputation, and Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 274-308, October.
  20. Al-Najjar, Nabil I., 1997. "Incentive Contracts in Two-Sided Moral Hazards with Multiple Agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 174-195, May.
  21. Li, Jingyuan & Liu, Yongming & Tian, Guoqiang, 2009. "A reputation strategic model of monetary policy in continuous-time," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 523-533, December.
  22. Jeffery Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 2002. "When is Reputation Bad?," Discussion Papers 1358, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  23. Long, Iain W., 2015. "Better feared than loved: Reputations and the motives for conflict," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 46-61.
  24. Wiseman, Thomas, 2009. "Reputation and exogenous private learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1352-1357, May.
  25. Kanagaretnam, Kiridaran & Mestelman, Stuart & Nainar, S.M. Khalid & Shehata, Mohamed, 2010. "Trust and reciprocity with transparency and repeated interactions," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 241-247, March.
  26. Eilon Solan & Leeat Yariv, 1998. "Games with Espionage," Discussion Papers 1257, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  27. Xu, Hong & Chen, Jianqing & Whinston, Andrew B., 2008. "Audited reputation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(3), pages 359-362, September.
  28. Hu, Ju, 2014. "Reputation in the presence of noisy exogenous learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 64-73.
  29. Gottlieb, Daniel, 2014. "Imperfect memory and choice under risk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 127-158.
  30. Luciano Andreozzi, 2008. "Inspection games with long-run inspectors," Department of Economics Working Papers 0821, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
  31. Monte, Daniel, 2013. "Bounded memory and permanent reputations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(5), pages 345-354.
  32. Atakan, Alp E. & Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2015. "Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 553-605.
  33. Sacco, Pier Luigi & Viviani, Michele, 2005. "Corporate Social Responsibility: theoretical perspectives in the Italian Debate," AICCON Working Papers 11-2005, Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit, revised 03 Feb 2007.
  34. Swanson, Timothy & Mason, Robin, 1998. "Nonbargaining in the shadow of the law," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 121-140, June.
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