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Posterior Probabilities: Dominance and Optimism

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  • Sergiu Hart
  • Yosef Rinott

Abstract

The Bayesian posterior probability of the true state is stochastically dominated by that same posterior under the probability law of the true state. This generalizes to notions of "optimism" about posterior probabilities.

Suggested Citation

  • Sergiu Hart & Yosef Rinott, 2022. "Posterior Probabilities: Dominance and Optimism," Papers 2209.11601, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2209.11601
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kreps, David M. & Francetich, Alejandro, 2014. "Bayesian Inference Does Not Lead You Astray . . . On Average," Research Papers 3059, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    2. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 8, pages 143-161, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. Francetich, Alejandro & Kreps, David, 2014. "Bayesian inference does not lead you astray…on average," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(3), pages 444-446.
    4. Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2006. "Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195300796.
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    Cited by:

    1. Smolin, Alex & Doval, Laura, 2021. "Information Payoffs: An Interim Perspective," TSE Working Papers 21-1247, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    2. Sergiu Hart & Yosef Rinott, 2022. "Posterior Probabilities: Nonmonotonicity, Asymptotic Rates, Log-Concavity, and Tur\'an's Inequality," Papers 2209.11728, arXiv.org.
    3. Laura Doval & Alex Smolin, 2021. "Persuasion and Welfare," Papers 2109.03061, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2023.
    4. Giampaolo Bonomi, 2023. "The Disagreement Dividend," Papers 2308.06607, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2024.

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