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Citations for "Rationalization and Incomplete Information"

by Battigalli Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi Marciano

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  1. Georgy Artemov & Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Robust virtual implementation with incomplete information: Towards a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine," Working Papers 2007-14, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
  2. Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2005. "The Canonical Type Space for Interdependent Preferences," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000434, UCLA Department of Economics.
  3. Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2011. "Robust implementation in general mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 261-281, March.
  4. Liu, Qingmin, 2009. "On redundant types and Bayesian formulation of incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 2115-2145, September.
  5. Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen & Takahashi, Satoru, 2017. "Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 329-371.
  6. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000116, UCLA Department of Economics.
  7. Oury, Marion, 2015. "Continuous implementation with local payoff uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 656-677.
  8. Oyama, Daisuke & Tercieux, Olivier, 2010. "Robust equilibria under non-common priors," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 752-784, March.
  9. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(6), pages 1771-1813, November.
  10. Hu, Tai-Wei, 2007. "On p-rationalizability and approximate common certainty of rationality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 379-391, September.
  11. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011. "Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Working Papers 1332, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
  12. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Morris, Stephen, 2006. "Topologies on types," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(3), pages 275-309, September.
  13. Arieli, Itai, 2010. "Rationalizability in continuous games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(5), pages 912-924, September.
  14. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms"," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1561R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised May 2007.
  15. Pierpaolo Battigalli, 2006. "Rationalization In Signaling Games: Theory And Applications," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 8(01), pages 67-93.
  16. Tsakas Elias, 2012. "Rational belief hierarchies," Research Memorandum 004, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  17. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2007. "Interactive epistemology in games with payoff uncertainty," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(4), pages 165-184, December.
  18. Jonathan Weinstein & Muhamet Yildiz, 2004. "Finite-Order Implications of Any Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000065, David K. Levine.
  19. Amanda Friedenberg, 2006. "Can Hidden Variables Explain Correlation? (joint with Adam Brandenburger)," Theory workshop papers 815595000000000005, UCLA Department of Economics.
  20. Amanda Friedenberg & Martin Meier, 2017. "The context of the game," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 63(2), pages 347-386, February.
  21. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2008. "The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(2-3), pages 551-559, 04-05.
  22. Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz & Morris, Stephen, 2011. "The robustness of robust implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 2093-2104, September.
  23. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2009. "Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 76(4), pages 1175-1204.
  24. Penta, Antonio, 2015. "Robust dynamic implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 280-316.
  25. Ahn, David S., 2007. "Hierarchies of ambiguous beliefs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 286-301, September.
  26. Barry O'Neill, 2006. "Nuclear Weapons and National Prestige," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1560, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  27. Battigalli Pierpaolo & Di Tillio Alfredo & Grillo Edoardo & Penta Antonio, 2011. "Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-40, March.
  28. Dekel, Eddie & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2015. "Epistemic Game Theory," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier.
  29. Shimoji, Makoto & Schweinzer, Paul, 2015. "Implementation without incentive compatibility: Two stories with partially informed planners," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 258-267.
  30. Itai Arieli, 2008. "Rationalizability in Continuous Games," Discussion Paper Series dp495, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  31. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "Belief Free Incomplete Information Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1629, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  32. Liu, Qingmin, 2015. "Correlation and common priors in games with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 49-75.
  33. Harrington, Joseph E., 2017. "A theory of collusion with partial mutual understanding," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 140-158.
  34. Adam Brandenburger & Amanda Friedenberg, 2014. "Intrinsic Correlation in Games," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: The Language of Game Theory Putting Epistemics into the Mathematics of Games, chapter 4, pages 59-111 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  35. Azrieli, Yaron & Levin, Dan, 2011. "Dominance-solvable common-value large auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 301-309.
  36. Artemov, Georgy & Kunimoto, Takashi & Serrano, Roberto, 2013. "Robust virtual implementation: Toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 424-447.
  37. Müller, Christoph, 2016. "Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 407-450.
  38. Gul, Faruk & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 2016. "Interdependent preference models as a theory of intentions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 179-208.
  39. Weinstein, Jonathan & Yildiz, Muhamet, 2007. "Impact of higher-order uncertainty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 200-212, July.
  40. Frick, Mira & Romm, Assaf, 2015. "Rational behavior under correlated uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 56-71.
  41. Roger Guesnerie & Pedro Jara-Moroni, 2011. "Expectational coordination in simple economic contexts," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 47(2), pages 205-246, June.
  42. Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Faruk Gul, 2007. "The Canonical Space for Behavioral Types," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000345, UCLA Department of Economics.
  43. Weinstein, Jonathan & Yildiz, Muhamet, 2011. "Sensitivity of equilibrium behavior to higher-order beliefs in nice games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 288-300, May.
  44. Yamashita, Takuro, 2015. "Strategic and structural uncertainty in robust implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 267-279.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.