IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

The Effects of Credit Subsidies on Development

  • Antonio Antunes
  • Tiago Cavalcanti
  • Anne Villamil

Under credit market imperfections, the marginal productivity of capital will not necessarily be equalized, resulting in misallocation and lower output. Preferential interest rate policies are often used to remedy the problem. This paper constructs a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents, imperfect enforcement and costly intermediation. Occupational choice and firm size are determined endogenously by an agent's type (ability and net wealth) and credit market frictions. The credit program subsidizes the interest rate on loans and requires a fixed application cost, which might be null, in the form of bureaucracy and regulations. First, we find that the interest credit subsidy policy has no significant effect on output, but it can have negative effects on wages and government finances. The program is largely a transfer from households to a small group of entrepreneurs with minor aggregate effects. We include a transition analysis. Second, we provide quantitative estimates of the effects of reducing the frictions directly. When comparing differences in U.S. output per capita in baseline and simulations with counterfactually high frictions such as those observed in Brazil, intermediation costs and enforcement.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Economics, The Univeristy of Manchester in its series Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series with number 176.

in new window

Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:man:cgbcrp:176
Contact details of provider: Postal: Manchester M13 9PL
Phone: (0)161 275 4868
Fax: (0)161 275 4812
Web page:

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Nelson Souza-Sobrinho, 2010. "Macroeconomics of bank interest spreads: evidence from Brazil," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 1-32, January.
  2. Andrés Erosa & Ana Hidalgo Cabrillana, 2008. "On Finance As A Theory Of Tfp, Cross-Industry Productivity Differences, And Economic Rents," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 49(2), pages 437-473, 05.
  3. Douglas Gollin, 2002. "Getting Income Shares Right," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(2), pages 458-474, April.
  4. William G. Gale, 1988. "Economic Effects of Federal Credit Programs," UCLA Economics Working Papers 483, UCLA Department of Economics.
  5. Greenwood, Jeremy & Jovanovic, Boyan, 1990. "Financial Development, Growth, and the Distribution of Income," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(5), pages 1076-1107, October.
  6. Caselli, Francesco & Gennaioli, Nicola, 2007. "Economics and Politics of Alternative Institutional Reforms," CEPR Discussion Papers 6095, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Marco Cagetti & Mariacristina De Nardi, 2007. "Estate Taxation, Entrepreneurship, and Wealth," NBER Working Papers 13160, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Jeremy Greenwood & Juan M. Sanchez & Cheng Wang, 2007. "Financing Development: The Role of Information Costs," NBER Working Papers 13104, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Francisco J. Buera & Joseph P. Kaboski & Yongseok Shin, 2012. "The Macroeconomics of Microfinance," NBER Working Papers 17905, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas & Olivier Jeanne, 2004. "The Elusive Gains from International Financial Integration," IMF Working Papers 04/74, International Monetary Fund.
  11. Vincenzo Quadrini, 2000. "Entrepreneurship, Saving and Social Mobility," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(1), pages 1-40, January.
  12. Hyeok Jeong & Robert M. Townsend, 2005. "Sources of TFP Growth: Occupational Choice and Financial Deepening," IEPR Working Papers 05.28, Institute of Economic Policy Research (IEPR), revised May 2005.
  13. Yongseok Shin & Francisco Buera, 2007. "Financial Frictions and the Persistence of History: A Quantitative Exploration," 2007 Meeting Papers 300, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  14. Pedro S. Amaral & Erwan Quintin, 2010. "Limited Enforcement, Financial Intermediation, And Economic Development: A Quantitative Assessment," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 51(3), pages 785-811, 08.
  15. Robert E. Lucas Jr., 1978. "On the Size Distribution of Business Firms," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 9(2), pages 508-523, Autumn.
  16. Antunes, Antonio R. & Cavalcanti, Tiago V. de V., 2007. "Start up costs, limited enforcement, and the hidden economy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 203-224, January.
  17. Lazzarini, Sergio G. & Musacchio, Aldo, 2010. "Leviathan as a Minority Shareholder: A Study of Equity Purchases by the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES), 1995-2003," Insper Working Papers wpe_221, Insper Working Paper, Insper Instituto de Ensino e Pesquisa.
  18. Lee, Jong-Wha, 1996. " Government Interventions and Productivity Growth," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 391-414, September.
  19. António Antunes & Tiago Cavalcanti & Anne Villamil, 2006. "Computing General Equilibrium Models with Occupational Choice and Financial Frictions," SCAPE Policy Research Working Paper Series 0611, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics, SCAPE.
  20. Claessens, Stijn & Feijen, Erik & Laeven, Luc, 2008. "Political connections and preferential access to finance: The role of campaign contributions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3), pages 554-580, June.
  21. Costas Azariadis & Leo Kaas, 2007. "Is dynamic general equilibrium a theory of everything?," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 13-41, July.
  22. Li, Wenli, 2002. "Entrepreneurship and government subsidies: A general equilibrium analysis," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 26(11), pages 1815-1844, September.
  23. Daron Acemoglu & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 1994. "Was Prometheus unbound by chance? Risk, diversification and growth," Economics Working Papers 98, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  24. Yongseok Shin & Benjamin Moll & Francisco J. Buera, 2011. "Well-Intended Policies," 2011 Meeting Papers 1244, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  25. Bruce D. Smith & Michael J. Stutzer, 1989. "Credit Rationing and Government Loan Programs: A Welfare Analysis," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 17(2), pages 177-193.
  26. Erwan Quintin, 2001. "Limited enforcement and the organization of production," Center for Latin America Working Papers 0601, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
  27. Rui Castro & Gian Luca Clementi & Glenn MacDonald, 2004. "Investor Protection, Optimal Incentives, and Economic Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 119(3), pages 1131-1175.
  28. Demirguc, Asli & Huizinga, Harry, 1999. "Determinants of Commercial Bank Interest Margins and Profitability: Some International Evidence," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 13(2), pages 379-408, May.
  29. Quadrini, Vincenzo, 1999. "The Importance of Entrepreneurship for Wealth Concentration and Mobility," Review of Income and Wealth, International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, vol. 45(1), pages 1-19, March.
  30. Oded Galor & Joseph Zeira, 1993. "Income Distribution and Macroeconomics," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 60(1), pages 35-52.
  31. Francesco Caselli & Nicola Gennaioli, 2008. "Economics and Politics of Alternative Institutional Reforms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 123(3), pages 1197-1250.
  32. José Wynne, 2005. "Wealth as a Determinant of Comparative Advantage," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 226-254, March.
  33. Abhijit V. Banerjee & Benjamin Moll, 2010. "Why Does Misallocation Persist?," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 189-206, January.
  34. Thorsten Koeppl & Cyril Monnet & Erwan Quintin, 2014. "Efficient contract enforcement," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 55(1), pages 161-183, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:man:cgbcrp:176. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marianne Sensier)

The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Marianne Sensier to update the entry or send us the correct address

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.