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The perils of nominal targets

  • Armenter, Roc

    (Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia)

A monetary authority can be committed to pursuing an inflation, price-level, or nominal output target yet systematically fail to achieve the specified goals. Constrained by the zero lower bound on the policy rate, the monetary authority is unable to implement its objectives when private-sector expectations stray away from the target in the first place. Low-inflation expectations become self-fulfilling, leading to multiple Markov equilibria. Private-sector expectations are anchored on a unique Markov equilibrium if the monetary authority is given a strong stabilization goal for the policy rate. However, policy-rate stabilization may not improve welfare as the resulting policy is severely distorted.

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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia in its series Working Papers with number 14-2.

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Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 10 Dec 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fip:fedpwp:14-2
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  1. Michael Dotsey & Andreas Hornstein, 2011. "On the implementation of Markov-perfect monetary policy," Working Papers 11-29, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  2. Siu, Henry E., 2008. "Time consistent monetary policy with endogenous price rigidity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 138(1), pages 184-210, January.
  3. Alexander L. Wolman, 2003. "Real implications of the zero bound on nominal interest rates," Working Paper 03-15, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  4. S. Boragan Aruoba & Frank Schorfheide, 2013. "Macroeconomic dynamics near the ZLB: a tale of two equilibria," Working Papers 13-29, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  5. Berg, Claes & Jonung, Lars, 1998. "Pioneering Price Level Targeting:The Swedish Experience 1931-1937," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 290, Stockholm School of Economics.
  6. Jesús Fernández-Villaverde & Grey Gordon & Pablo A. Guerrón-Quintana & Juan Rubio-Ramírez, 2012. "Nonlinear Adventures at the Zero Lower Bound," NBER Working Papers 18058, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Glenn D. Rudebusch, 2005. "Monetary policy inertia: fact or fiction?," Working Paper Series 2005-19, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  8. S. Borağan Aruoba & Pablo Cuba-Borda & Frank Schorfheide, 2013. "Macroeconomic Dynamics Near the ZLB: A Tale of Two Countries," NBER Working Papers 19248, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Evans, George W. & Guse, Eran & Honkapohja, Seppo, 2007. "Liquidity Traps, Learning and Stagnation," CEPR Discussion Papers 6355, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Adam, Klaus & Billi, Roberto M., 2004. "Optimal monetary policy under commitment with a zero bound on nominal interest rates," CFS Working Paper Series 2004/13, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
  11. Anton Nakov, 2006. "Optimal and Simple Monetary Policy Rules with Zero Floor on the Nominal Interest Rate," Banco de Espa�a Working Papers 0637, Banco de Espa�a.
  12. Karen Kopecky & Richard Suen, 2010. "Finite State Markov-chain Approximations to Highly Persistent Processes," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 13(3), pages 701-714, July.
  13. R. Anton Braun & Lena Mareen Körber & Yuichiro Waki, 2012. "Some unpleasant properties of log-linearized solutions when the nominal rate is zero," Working Paper 2012-05, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
  14. Jung, Taehun & Teranishi, Yuki & Watanabe, Tsutomu, 2005. "Optimal Monetary Policy at the Zero-Interest-Rate Bound," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(5), pages 813-35, October.
  15. Roc Armenter, 2008. "A General Theory (and Some Evidence) of Expectation Traps in Monetary Policy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(5), pages 867-895, 08.
  16. Eusepi, Stefano, 2007. "Learnability and monetary policy: A global perspective," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(4), pages 1115-1131, May.
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