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Expectations-Driven Liquidity Traps: Implications for Monetary and Fiscal Policy

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  • Taisuke Nakata
  • Sebastian Schmidt

Abstract

We study optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a New Keynesian model where occasional declines in agents' confidence give rise to persistent liquidity trap episodes. There is no straightforward recipe for enhancing welfare in this economy. Raising the inflation target or appointing an inflation-conservative central banker mitigates the inflation shortfall away from the lower bound but exacerbates deflationary pressures at the lower bound. Using government spending as an additional policy instrument worsens allocations at and away from the lower bound. However, appointing a policymaker who is sufficiently less concerned with government spending stabilization than society eliminates expectations-driven liquidity traps.

Suggested Citation

  • Taisuke Nakata & Sebastian Schmidt, 2019. "Expectations-Driven Liquidity Traps: Implications for Monetary and Fiscal Policy," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2019-053, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2019-53
    DOI: 10.17016/FEDS.2019.053
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    Cited by:

    1. Hills, Timothy S. & Nakata, Taisuke & Schmidt, Sebastian, 2019. "Effective lower bound risk," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 120(C).
    2. Sanjay R. Singh & Nicolas Caramp, 2020. "Bond Premium Cyclicality and Liquidity Traps," Working Papers 336, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Effective Lower Bound; Sunspot Equilibria; Monetary Policy; Fiscal Policy; Discretion; Policy Delegation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy

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