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Equilibrium Risk Shifting and Interest Rate in an Opaque Financial System

  • Challe, E.
  • Mojon, B.
  • Ragot, X.

We analyze the risk-taking behavior of heterogenous intermediaries that are protected by limited liability and choose both their amount of leverage and the risk exposure of their portfolio. Due to the opacity of the financial sector, outside providers of funds cannot distinguish “prudent” intermediaries from “imprudent” ones that voluntarily hold high-risk portfolios and expose themselves to the risk of bankrupcy. We show how the number of imprudent intermediaries is determined in equilibrium jointly with the interest rate, and how both ultimately depend on the cross-sectional distribution of intermediaries’ capital. One implication of our analysis is that an exogenous increase in the supply of funds to the intermediary sector (following, e.g., capital inflows) lowers interest rates and raises the number of imprudent intermediaries (the risk-taking channel of low interest rates). Another one is that easy financing may lead an increasing number of intermediaries to gamble for resurrection following a bad shock to the sector’s capital, again raising economy wide systemic risk (the gambling-for-resurrection channel of falling equity).

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Paper provided by Banque de France in its series Working papers with number 391.

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Length: 43 pages
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bfr:banfra:391
Contact details of provider: Postal: Banque de France 31 Rue Croix des Petits Champs LABOLOG - 49-1404 75049 PARIS
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  29. repec:fip:fedgsq:y:2005:i:mar10 is not listed on IDEAS
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