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The dark side of liquidity creation: Leverage and systemic risk

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  • Acharya, Viral V.
  • Thakor, Anjan V.

Abstract

We consider a model in which the threat of bank liquidations by creditors as well as equity-based compensation incentives both discipline bankers, but with different consequences. Greater use of equity leads to lower ex-ante bank liquidity, whereas greater use of debt leads to a higher probability of inefficient bank liquidation. The bank's privately-optimal capital structure trades off these two costs. With uncertainty about aggregate risk, bank creditors learn from other banks’ liquidation decisions. Such inference can lead to contagious liquidations, some of which are inefficient; this is a negative externality that is ignored in privately-optimal bank capital structures. Thus, under plausible conditions, banks choose excessive leverage relative to the socially optimal level, providing a rationale for bank capital regulation. While a blanket regulatory forbearance policy can eliminate contagion, it also eliminates all market discipline. However, a regulator generating its own information about aggregate risk, rather than relying on market signals, can restore efficiency and market discipline by intervening selectively.

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  • Acharya, Viral V. & Thakor, Anjan V., 2016. "The dark side of liquidity creation: Leverage and systemic risk," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 4-21.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinin:v:28:y:2016:i:c:p:4-21
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2016.08.004
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Micro-prudential regulation; Macro-prudential regulation; Market discipline; Contagion; Lender of last resort; Bailout; Capital requirements;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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