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Going for broke: New Century Financial Corporation, 2004-2006

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  • Landier, Augustin
  • Sraer, David
  • Thesmar, David

Abstract

Using loan level data, we investigate the lending behavior of a large subprime mortgage issuer prior to its bankruptcy in the beginning of 2007. In 2004, this firm suddenly started to massively issue new loans contracts that featured deferred amortization ("interestonly loans") to high income and high FICO households. We document that these loans were not only riskier, but also that their returns were more sensitive to real estate prices than standard contracts. Implicitly, this lender dramatically increased its exposure to its own legacy asset, which is what a standard model of portfolio selection in distress would predict. We provide additional evidence on New Century’s lending behavior, which are consistent with a risk shifting strategy. Finally, we are able to tie this sudden change in behavior to the sharp monetary policy tightening implemented by the Fed in the spring of 2004. Our findings shed new light on the relationship between monetary policy and risk taking by financial institutions.

Suggested Citation

  • Landier, Augustin & Sraer, David & Thesmar, David, 2010. "Going for broke: New Century Financial Corporation, 2004-2006," IDEI Working Papers 649, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  • Handle: RePEc:ide:wpaper:23653
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Atif Mian & Amir Sufi, 2008. "The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion: Evidence from the 2007 Mortgage Default Crisis," NBER Working Papers 13936, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    3. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 2010. "Unstable banking," Scholarly Articles 33077921, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    4. Albert Saiz, 2010. "The Geographic Determinants of Housing Supply," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 125(3), pages 1253-1296.
    5. Atif Mian & Amir Sufi, 2009. "The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion: Evidence from the U.S. Mortgage Default Crisis," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 124(4), pages 1449-1496.
    6. Acharya, Viral V. & Schnabl, Philipp & Suarez, Gustavo, 2013. "Securitization without risk transfer," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(3), pages 515-536.
    7. Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2009. "The Credit Crisis: Conjectures about Causes and Remedies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(2), pages 606-610, May.
    8. Nadauld, Taylor D. & Weisbach, Michael S., 2012. "Did securitization affect the cost of corporate debt?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 332-352.
    9. Susan E. Woodward & Robert E. Hall, 2012. "Diagnosing Consumer Confusion and Sub-optimal Shopping Effort: Theory and Mortgage-Market Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(7), pages 3249-3276, December.
    10. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 2010. "Unstable banking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(3), pages 306-318, September.
    11. Benjamin J. Keys & Tanmoy Mukherjee & Amit Seru & Vikrant Vig, 2010. "Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 125(1), pages 307-362.
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    Cited by:

    1. Challe, Edouard & Mojon, Benoit & Ragot, Xavier, 2013. "Equilibrium risk shifting and interest rate in an opaque financial system," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 117-133.
    2. Tornell, Aaron & Rancière, Romain, 2011. "Financial Black-Holes: The Interaction of Financial Regulation and Bailout Guarantees," CEPR Discussion Papers 8248, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. John Thanassoulis, 2011. "Industrial Structure, Executives' Pay And Myopic Risk Taking," Economics Series Working Papers 571, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    4. Sylvain Champonnois, 2011. "The limits of market discipline: proprietary trading and aggregate risk," 2011 Meeting Papers 1013, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    5. Carlos González‐Aguado & Javier Suarez, 2015. "Interest Rates and Credit Risk," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(2-3), pages 445-480, March.
    6. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/2ld6ogm9lq9b4b37ft2unhirm4 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. repec:hal:psewpa:hal-00719952 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. John Thanassoulis, 2013. "Industry Structure, Executive Pay, and Short-Termism," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(2), pages 402-419, June.
    9. Marco Becht & Patrick Bolton & Ailsa Röell, 2011. "Why bank governance is different," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 27(3), pages 437-463.
    10. Benjamin J. Keys & Tomasz Piskorski & Amit Seru & Vikrant Vig, 2012. "Mortgage Financing in the Housing Boom and Bust," NBER Chapters, in: Housing and the Financial Crisis, pages 143-204, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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