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Industrial Structure, Executives' Pay And Myopic Risk Taking

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  • John Thanassoulis

Abstract

This study outlines a new theory linking industrial structure to optimal employment contracts and value reducing risk taking. Firms hire their executives using optimal contracts derived within a competitive labour market. To motivate effort firms must use some variable remuneration. Such remuneration introduces a myopic risk taking problem: an executive would wish to inflate early expected earnings at some risk to future profits. To manage this some bonus pay is deferred. Convergence in size amongst the largest firms makes the cost of managing the myopic risk taking problem grow faster than the cost of managing the moral hazard problem. Eventually the optimal contract jumps from one achieving zero myopic risk taking to one tolerating the possibility of myopic risk taking. Under some conditions the industry partititions: the largest firms hire executives on contracts tolerant of myopic risk taking, smaller firms ensure myopia is ruled out.

Suggested Citation

  • John Thanassoulis, 2011. "Industrial Structure, Executives' Pay And Myopic Risk Taking," Economics Series Working Papers 571, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:571
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    File URL: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/materials/working_papers/paper571.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Laux, Volker, 2012. "Stock option vesting conditions, CEO turnover, and myopic investment," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(3), pages 513-526.
    2. Bannier, Christina E. & Feess, Eberhard & Packham, Natalie, 2014. "Incentive schemes, private information and the double-edged role of competition for agents," CFS Working Paper Series 475, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Myopic risk taking; Moral hazard; Compensation; Bonuses; Bankers' pay; Tail risk; Industrial structure;

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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