The limits of market discipline: proprietary trading and aggregate risk
Market discipline is the mechanism by which the adjustment of cost of capital to the level of risk feeds into managerial incentives and deters excessive risk-taking. We show that risk-taking by entrepreneurs and demand for risky securities by risk-neutral investors (e.g. fund managers or proprietary traders) are mutually reinforcing. Larger risk-neutral fund managers (relative to risk-averse investors) not only undermine market discipline and lead to more risk-taking, but they also benefit more from the upside of risk and become relatively larger if the project pays out, which leads to even more risk-taking in the next period. The model explains documented features of the business cycle: bubble-like asset prices (procyclical run-up in prices and procyclical underpricing of risk), shorter cycles and countercyclical leverage of the non-financial sector.
|Date of creation:||2011|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA|
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- Alessandro Barbarino & Boyan Jovanovic, 2007.
"Shakeouts And Market Crashes,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 48(2), pages 385-420, 05.
- Alessandro Barbarino & Boyan Jovanovic, 2004. "Shakeouts and Market Crashes," NBER Working Papers 10556, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Zhiguo He & Arvind Krishnamurthy, 2008. "A Model of Capital and Crises," NBER Working Papers 14366, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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