Bank Competition and Economic Stability: The Role of Monetary Policy
This paper analyzes the dual role of monetary policy for economic efficiency and stability in a model of endogenous bank competition. Multiple equilibria emerge from the complementarity between bank and non-financial firm decisions. Adverse aggregate or idiosyncratic liquidity shocks may cause a breakdown in which the economy collapses into a no-production equilibrium. Less bank competition improves the profitability of banks and makes the economy less vulnerable to adverse shocks but it also distorts the efficient allocation of capital. This stability/efficiency tradeoff creates a motive for monetary policy to be tight when liquidity is abundant to spur bank competition and to be loose in bad times to restore the profitability of banks and decrease the likelihood of economic and financial crashes.
|Date of creation:||2009|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA|
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Nicola Cetorelli & Philip E. Strahan, 2004.
"Finance as a Barrier to Entry: Bank Competition and Industry Structure in Local U.S. Markets,"
NBER Working Papers
10832, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Nicola Cetorelli & Philip E. Strahan, 2006. "Finance as a Barrier to Entry: Bank Competition and Industry Structure in Local U.S. Markets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(1), pages 437-461, 02.
- Nicola Cetorelli & Philip E. Strahan, 2004. "Finance as a barrier to entry: bank competition and industry structure in local U.S. markets," Working Paper Series WP-04-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
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