IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/bdm/wpaper/2017-10.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Tight Money-Tight Credit: Coordination Failure in the Conduct of Monetary and Financial Policies

Author

Listed:
  • Carrillo Julio A.
  • Mendoza Enrique G.
  • Nuguer Victoria
  • Roldán-Peña Jessica

Abstract

In a New Keynesian model with the BGG accelerator and risk shocks, we show that violations of Tinbergen's Rule and strategic interaction between economic authorities undermine the effectiveness of monetary and financial policies. Separate monetary and financial policy rules produce higher welfare than a monetary rule augmented with credit spreads. The latter yields a tight money-tight credit regime in which the interest rate responds too much to inflation and not enough to credit. Reaction curves for the policy-rule elasticities are nonlinear, which reflects shifts in these elasticities from strategic substitutes to complements. The Nash equilibrium is inferior to the Cooperative equilibrium, both are inferior to a first-best outcome, and both might produce tight money-tight credit regimes.

Suggested Citation

  • Carrillo Julio A. & Mendoza Enrique G. & Nuguer Victoria & Roldán-Peña Jessica, 2017. "Tight Money-Tight Credit: Coordination Failure in the Conduct of Monetary and Financial Policies," Working Papers 2017-10, Banco de México.
  • Handle: RePEc:bdm:wpaper:2017-10
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.banxico.org.mx/publications-and-press/banco-de-mexico-working-papers/%7B03A0F152-7EFC-1696-9A69-2CC086D15C7F%7D.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bernanke, Ben S. & Gertler, Mark & Gilchrist, Simon, 1999. "The financial accelerator in a quantitative business cycle framework," Handbook of Macroeconomics,in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 21, pages 1341-1393 Elsevier.
    2. Avinash Dixit & Luisa Lambertini, 2003. "Interactions of Commitment and Discretion in Monetary and Fiscal Policies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1522-1542, December.
    3. Vasco Curdia & Michael Woodford, 2010. "Credit Spreads and Monetary Policy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(s1), pages 3-35, September.
    4. Dominic Quint & Pau Rabanal, 2014. "Monetary and Macroprudential Policy in an Estimated DSGE Model of the Euro Area," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 10(2), pages 169-236, June.
    5. Lambertini, Luisa & Nuguer, Victoria & Uysal, Pinar, 2017. "Mortgage default in an estimated model of the U.S. housing market," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 171-201.
    6. Taylor, John B. & Williams, John C., 2010. "Simple and Robust Rules for Monetary Policy," Handbook of Monetary Economics,in: Benjamin M. Friedman & Michael Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 15, pages 829-859 Elsevier.
    7. Julio Carrillo & Celine Poilly, 2013. "How do financial frictions affect the spending multiplier during a liquidity trap?," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 16(2), pages 296-311, April.
    8. Enrique G. Mendoza, 2016. "Macroprudential Policy: Promise and Challenges," NBER Working Papers 22868, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Mendoza, Enrique G. & Tesar, Linda L., 2005. "Why hasn't tax competition triggered a race to the bottom? Some quantitative lessons from the EU," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 163-204, January.
    10. Gabriele Galati & Richhild Moessner, 2013. "Macroprudential Policy – A Literature Review," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(5), pages 846-878, December.
    11. Bodenstein, Martin & Guerrieri, Luca & LaBriola, Joe, 2019. "Macroeconomic policy games," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 64-81.
    12. Schmitt-Grohe, Stephanie & Uribe, Martin, 2004. "Solving dynamic general equilibrium models using a second-order approximation to the policy function," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 755-775, January.
    13. Javier Bianchi & Enrique G. Mendoza, 2018. "Optimal Time-Consistent Macroprudential Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(2), pages 588-634.
    14. Lawrence J. Christiano & Martin Eichenbaum & Charles L. Evans, 2005. "Nominal Rigidities and the Dynamic Effects of a Shock to Monetary Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(1), pages 1-45, February.
    15. Paolo Angelini & Stefano Neri & Fabio Panetta, 2014. "The Interaction between Capital Requirements and Monetary Policy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 46(6), pages 1073-1112, September.
    16. Andrew P. Blake & Tatiana Kirsanova, 2011. "Inflation Conservatism and Monetary-Fiscal Policy Interactions," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 7(2), pages 41-83, June.
    17. Angeloni, Ignazio & Faia, Ester, 2013. "Capital regulation and monetary policy with fragile banks," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 311-324.
    18. Martin M Andreasen & Jesús Fernández-Villaverde & Juan F Rubio-Ramírez, 2018. "The Pruned State-Space System for Non-Linear DSGE Models: Theory and Empirical Applications," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 85(1), pages 1-49.
    19. Woodford, Michael, 2010. "Optimal Monetary Stabilization Policy," Handbook of Monetary Economics,in: Benjamin M. Friedman & Michael Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 14, pages 723-828 Elsevier.
    20. Yellen, Janet L., 2014. "Monetary Policy and Financial Stability : a speech at the 2014 Michel Camdessus Central Banking Lecture, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., July 2, 2014," Speech 812, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    21. Frank Smets, 2014. "Financial Stability and Monetary Policy: How Closely Interlinked?," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 10(2), pages 263-300, June.
    22. Enrique Mendoza, 2016. "Macroprudential Policy: Promise and Challenges," PIER Working Paper Archive 16-020, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 24 Oct 2016.
    23. John C. Williams, 2010. "Monetary policy in a low inflation economy with learning," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, pages 1-12.
    24. Dixit, Avinash & Lambertini, Luisa, 2001. "Monetary-fiscal policy interactions and commitment versus discretion in a monetary union," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 977-987, May.
    25. Lawrence J. Christiano & Roberto Motto & Massimo Rostagno, 2014. "Risk Shocks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(1), pages 27-65, January.
    26. Lars E.O. Svensson, 2014. "Inflation Targeting and "Leaning against the Wind"," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 10(2), pages 103-114, June.
    27. Paoli, Bianca De & Paustian, Matthias, 2013. "Coordinating monetary and macroprudential policies," Staff Reports 653, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    28. Bernanke, Ben & Gertler, Mark, 1989. "Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 14-31, March.
    29. Townsend, Robert M., 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 265-293, October.
    30. repec:wly:jmoncb:v:49:y:2017:i:2-3:p:319-349 is not listed on IDEAS
    31. Yun, Tack, 1996. "Nominal price rigidity, money supply endogeneity, and business cycles," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(2-3), pages 345-370, April.
    32. Michael Woodford, 2012. "Inflation Targeting and Financial Stability," NBER Working Papers 17967, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    33. Calvo, Guillermo A., 1983. "Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 383-398, September.
    34. Benjamin M. Friedman & Michael Woodford (ed.), 2010. "Handbook of Monetary Economics," Handbook of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 3, number 3.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Caterina Mendicino & Kalin Nikolov & Javier Suarez & Dominik Supera, 2018. "Bank Capital in the Short and in the Long Run," Working Papers wp2018_1807, CEMFI.
    2. repec:eee:finsta:v:38:y:2018:i:c:p:72-80 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Rochelle M. Edge & J. Nellie Liang, 2019. "New Financial Stability Governance Structures and Central Banks," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2019-019, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US).
    4. Agur, Itai & Demertzis, Maria, 2019. "Will macroprudential policy counteract monetary policy’s effects on financial stability?," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 65-75.
    5. repec:bis:bisbps:97 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financial Frictions; Monetary Policy; Financial Policy;

    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bdm:wpaper:2017-10. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dirección de Sistemas). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/bangvmx.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.