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Maxim Ivanov

Personal Details

First Name:Maxim
Middle Name:
Last Name:Ivanov
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:piv26
http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/mivanov/
Terminal Degree:2008 Department of Economics; Pennsylvania State University (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Department of Economics
McMaster University

Hamilton, Canada
http://www.mcmaster.ca/economics/

: (905) 525-9140 ext. 22765
(905) 521-8232
1280 Main Street West, Hamilton, Ontario, L8S 4M4
RePEc:edi:demcmca (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

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Jump to: Articles

Articles

  1. Ivanov, Maxim, 2014. "Beneficial mediated communication in cheap talk," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 129-135.
  2. Maxim Ivanov, 2013. "Information revelation in competitive markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(1), pages 337-365, January.
  3. Ivanov, Maxim, 2010. "Informational control and organizational design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 721-751, March.
  4. Ivanov, Maxim, 2010. "Communication via a strategic mediator," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 869-884, March.
  5. Ivanov, Maxim, 2009. "Niche market or mass market?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(3), pages 217-220, December.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Articles

  1. Maxim Ivanov, 2013. "Information revelation in competitive markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(1), pages 337-365, January.

    Cited by:

    1. Cristián Troncoso-Valverde, 2015. "Information Release in Second–Price Auctions," Serie Working Papers 15, Universidad del Desarrollo, School of Business and Economics.
    2. Christian Ewerhart, 2013. "Regular type distributions in mechanism design and $$\rho $$ -concavity," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 53(3), pages 591-603, August.
    3. Salvatore Piccolo & Aldo Pignataro, 2016. "Consumer Loss Aversion, Product Experimentation and Implicit Collusion," CSEF Working Papers 457, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    4. Forand, Jean Guillaume, 2013. "Competing through information provision," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 438-451.
    5. Wang, Chengsi, 2011. "Informative Advertising, Consumer Search and Transparency Policy," MPRA Paper 34977, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Piccolo, Salvatore & Pignataro, Aldo, 2018. "Consumer loss aversion, product experimentation and tacit collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 49-77.
    7. Maxim Ivanov, 2016. "Dynamic learning and strategic communication," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(3), pages 627-653, August.
    8. Peter Postl, 2011. "Efficiency versus Optimality in Procurement," Discussion Papers 11-03rr, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    9. Drugov, Mikhail & Troya Martinez, Marta, 2012. "Vague Lies: How to Advise Consumers When They Complain," CEPR Discussion Papers 9201, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

  2. Ivanov, Maxim, 2010. "Informational control and organizational design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 721-751, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Irene Valsecchi, 2013. "The expert problem: a survey," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 303-331, November.
    2. Otto H. Swank & Bauke Visser, 2015. "Learning from Others? Decision Rights, Strategic Communication, and Reputational Concerns," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 109-149, November.
    3. Kolotilin, Anton & Li, Hao & Li, Wei, 2013. "Optimal limited authority for principal," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2344-2382.
    4. Anton Kolotilin, 2013. "Experimental Design to Persuade," Discussion Papers 2013-17, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    5. Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2016. "Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 67950, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    6. Deimen, Inga & Szalay, Dezsö, 2014. "A Smooth, strategic communication," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 479, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    7. Frug, Alexander, 2016. "A note on optimal cheap talk equilibria in a discrete state space," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 180-185.
    8. Hedlund, Jonas, 2017. "Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 229-268.
    9. Ambrus, Attila & Azevedo, Eduardo M. & Kamada, Yuichiro, 2013. "Hierarchical cheap talk," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), January.
    10. Szalay, Dezsö & Deimen, Inga, 2016. "Information, Authority, And Smooth Communication In Organizations," Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145668, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    11. Ivanov Maxim, 2015. "Dynamic Information Revelation in Cheap Talk," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 251-275, July.
    12. Vincent Anesi & Daniel J. Seidmann, 2009. "Optimal Delegation with a Finite Number of States," Discussion Papers 2009-20, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    13. Emir Kamenica & Matthew Gentzkow, 2009. "Bayesian Persuasion," NBER Working Papers 15540, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Krähmer, Daniel & Kováč, Eugen, 2016. "Optimal sequential delegation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 849-888.
    15. Ricardo Alonso & Odilon Câmara, 2016. "Persuading Voters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(11), pages 3590-3605, November.
    16. Igor Letina & Shuo Liu & Nick Netzer, 2017. "Delegating performance evaluation," ECON - Working Papers 266, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Mar 2018.
    17. Maria Goltsman, 2011. "Optimal information transmission in a holdup problem," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 42(3), pages 495-526, September.
    18. Eric Schmidbauer & Dmitry Lubensky, 2016. "Equilibrium Informativeness in Veto-Based Delegation," Working Papers 2016-03, University of Central Florida, Department of Economics.
    19. Maxim Ivanov, 2016. "Dynamic learning and strategic communication," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(3), pages 627-653, August.
    20. Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2014. "Persuading skeptics and reaffirming believers," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 58680, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    21. Rossella Argenziano & Sergei Severinov & Francesco Squintani, 2016. "Strategic Information Acquisition and Transmission," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 119-155, August.
    22. Anbarci, Nejat & Ghosh, Saptarshi P. & Roy, Jaideep, 2017. "Information control in reputational cheap talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 153-160.
    23. Pei, Harry Di, 2015. "Communication with endogenous information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 132-149.
    24. Hedlund, Jonas, 2014. "Bayesian signaling," Working Papers 0577, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    25. Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2016. "Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 672-706.
    26. Anton Kolotilin, 2013. "Optimal Information Disclosure: Quantity vs. Quality," Discussion Papers 2013-19, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.

  3. Ivanov, Maxim, 2010. "Communication via a strategic mediator," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 869-884, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Kolotilin, Anton & Li, Hao & Li, Wei, 2013. "Optimal limited authority for principal," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2344-2382.
    2. Liang, Pinghan, 2013. "Optimal delegation via a strategic intermediary," MPRA Paper 45271, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Wei Li, 2010. "Peddling Influence through Intermediaries," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(3), pages 1136-1162, June.
    4. Simona Fabrizi & Steffen Lippert, 2012. "Due Diligence, Research Joint Ventures, and Incentives to Innovate," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 168(4), pages 588-611, December.
    5. Gregory Pavlov, 2013. "Correlated Equilibria and Communication Equilibria in All-pay Auctions," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 20132, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
    6. Deffains, Bruno & Demougin, Dominique & Desrieux, Claudine, 2017. "Choosing ADR or litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 33-40.
    7. Baumann, Florian & Friehe, Tim, 2013. "Cheap talk about the detection probability," DICE Discussion Papers 90, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    8. Ying Chen & Sidartha Gordon, 2015. "Information transmission in nested sender–receiver games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(3), pages 543-569, April.
    9. Ambrus, Attila & Azevedo, Eduardo M. & Kamada, Yuichiro, 2013. "Hierarchical cheap talk," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), January.
    10. Li Ming, 2010. "Advice from Multiple Experts: A Comparison of Simultaneous, Sequential, and Hierarchical Communication," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-24, April.
    11. Hitoshi Sadakane, 2017. "Multistage Information Transmission with Voluntary Monetary Transfer," ISER Discussion Paper 1006, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    12. Lai, Ernest K., 2014. "Expert advice for amateurs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 1-16.
    13. Lim, Wooyoung, 2014. "Communication in bargaining over decision rights," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 159-179.
    14. Iaryczower, M & Oliveros, S, 2013. "Power Brokers: Middlemen in Legislative Bargaining," Economics Discussion Papers 8980, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
    15. Blume, Andreas, 2012. "A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender–receiver games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 510-517.
    16. Mechtenberg, Lydia & Münster, Johannes, 2012. "A strategic mediator who is biased in the same direction as the expert can improve information transmission," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 490-492.
    17. Chirantan Ganguly & Indrajit Ray, 2009. "Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game," Discussion Papers 05-08r, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    18. Fox, Justin & Van Weelden, Richard, 2010. "Partisanship and the effectiveness of oversight," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(9-10), pages 674-687, October.
    19. Maxim Ivanov, 2016. "Dynamic learning and strategic communication," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(3), pages 627-653, August.
    20. Blume, Andreas & Lai, Ernest K. & Lim, Wooyoung, 2014. "Eliciting Private Information with Noise: The Case of Randomized Response," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 490, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    21. Lu, Shih En, 2017. "Coordination-free equilibria in cheap talk games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 177-208.
    22. Omar A. Nayeem, 2017. "Bend Them but Don't Break Them: Passionate Workers, Skeptical Managers, and Decision Making in Organizations," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(3), pages 100-125, August.
    23. Pinghan Liang, 2017. "Transfer of authority within hierarchies," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 21(4), pages 273-290, December.
    24. Eric Lavallee, 2016. "Mediation with near insolvent defaulting suppliers: a linear optimisation model to find an optimal outcome," Papers 1602.04466, arXiv.org.
    25. Lai, Ernest K. & Lim, Wooyoung & Wang, Joseph Tao-yi, 2015. "An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 114-144.
    26. Rantakari, Heikki, 2014. "A simple model of project selection with strategic communication and uncertain motives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 14-42.
    27. Ivanov, Maxim, 2014. "Beneficial mediated communication in cheap talk," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 129-135.
    28. Pinghan Liang, 2010. "Transfer of Authority within Hierarchy," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000139, David K. Levine.
    29. Alonso, Ricardo & Rantakari, Heikki, 2014. "The art of brevity," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 58681, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    30. Ambrus, Attila & Lu, Shih En, 2014. "Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 174-189.
    31. Lim, Wooyoung, 2012. "Selling authority," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 393-415.
    32. Edoardo Grillo, 2013. "Reference Dependence, Risky Projects and Credible Information Transmission," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 331, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    33. Ambrus, Attila & Azevedo, Eduardo M. & Kamada, Yuichiro & Takagi, Yuki, 2013. "Legislative committees as information intermediaries: A unified theory of committee selection and amendment rules," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 103-115.

  4. Ivanov, Maxim, 2009. "Niche market or mass market?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(3), pages 217-220, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Wang, Chengsi, 2011. "Informative Advertising, Consumer Search and Transparency Policy," MPRA Paper 34977, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Maxim Ivanov, 2013. "Information revelation in competitive markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(1), pages 337-365, January.

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