Consumer Loss Aversion, Product Experimentation and Implicit Collusion
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More about this item
KeywordsCollusion; Loss Aversion; Product Experimentation; Vertical Differentiation;
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
- L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
- M30 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - General
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-COM-2016-11-13 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2016-11-13 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MKT-2016-11-13 (Marketing)
- NEP-UPT-2016-11-13 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
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