# Regular type distributions in mechanism design and $$\rho$$ -concavity

## Author Info

Listed author(s):
• Christian Ewerhart

()

## Abstract

Some of the best-known results in mechanism design depend critically on Myerson’s (Math Oper Res 6:58–73, 1981 ) regularity condition. For example, the second-price auction with reserve price is revenue maximizing only if the type distribution is regular. This paper offers two main findings. First, a new interpretation of regularity is developed—similar to that of a monotone hazard rate—in terms of being the next to fail. Second, using expanded concepts of concavity, a tight sufficient condition is obtained for a density to define a regular distribution. New examples of regular distributions are identified. Applications are discussed. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-012-0705-3

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## Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer & Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 53 (2013)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Pages: 591-603

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 Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:53:y:2013:i:3:p:591-603 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-012-0705-3 Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springer.com Order Information: Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/199/PS2

## References

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