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A quantitative version of Myerson regularity

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  • Schweizer, Nikolaus
  • Szech, Nora

Abstract

In auction and mechanism design, Myerson's classical regularity condition is often too weak for a quantitative analysis of performance. For instance, ratios between revenue and welfare, or sales probabilities may vanish at the boundary of Myerson regularity. This paper introduces L-regularity as a quantitative measure of how regular a distribution is. L-regularity includes Myerson regularity and the monotone hazard rate condition as special cases. We show that L-regularity implies sharp bounds on various key quantities in auction theory, thus extending several recent findings from quantitative auction and mechanism design.

Suggested Citation

  • Schweizer, Nikolaus & Szech, Nora, 2015. "A quantitative version of Myerson regularity," Working Paper Series in Economics 76, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Business Engineering.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:kitwps:76
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    L-regularity; Myerson regularity; Monotone Hazard Rate; Auctions; Mechanism Design; Approximation;

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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