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Dissecting the Effect of Credit Supply on Trade: Evidence from Matched Credit-Export Data

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  • Daniel Paravisini
  • Veronica Rappoport
  • Philipp Schnabl
  • Daniel Wolfenzon

Abstract

We estimate the elasticity of exports to credit using matched customs and firm-level bank credit data from Peru. To account for non-credit determinants of exports, we compare changes in exports of the same product and to the same destination by firms borrowing from banks differentially affected by capital-flow reversals during the 2008 financial crisis. We find that credit shocks affect the intensive margin of exports, but have no significant impact on entry or exit of firms to new product and destination markets. Our results suggest that credit shortages reduce exports through raising the variable cost of production, rather than the cost of financing sunk entry investments.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Paravisini & Veronica Rappoport & Philipp Schnabl & Daniel Wolfenzon, 2015. "Dissecting the Effect of Credit Supply on Trade: Evidence from Matched Credit-Export Data," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 82(1), pages 333-359.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:82:y:2015:i:1:p:333-359
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/restud/rdu028
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General
    • F30 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - General
    • F40 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - General
    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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