IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ier/iecrev/v41y2000i4p871-91.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Old-Boy Network and the Young-Gun Effect

Author

Listed:
  • Taylor, Curtis R

Abstract

A model of an exclusive group or class whose membership is governed by personal contact and interaction is studied. Members of this old-boy network attempt to shield themselves from transacting with opportunistic or incompetent individuals by dealing only infrequently with unproven nonmembers. This injures the unproven but qualified agents not in the network. Moreover, because recruitment of a new member creates a public good for network members, too little recruiting is performed in equilibrium. Copyright 2000 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Taylor, Curtis R, 2000. "The Old-Boy Network and the Young-Gun Effect," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(4), pages 871-891, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:41:y:2000:i:4:p:871-91
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Rafael Rob & Huanxing Yang, 2010. "Long-term relationships as safeguards," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 43(2), pages 143-166, May.
    2. Bowles, Samuel & Gintis, Herbert, 2004. "Persistent parochialism: trust and exclusion in ethnic networks," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 1-23, September.
    3. Bramoullé, Yann & Goyal, Sanjeev, 2016. "Favoritism," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 16-27.
    4. Philippe Aghion & Matthew O. Jackson, 2016. "Inducing Leaders to Take Risky Decisions: Dismissal, Tenure, and Term Limits," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 1-38, August.
    5. MacLeod, W. Bentley, 2006. "Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts," IZA Discussion Papers 1978, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    6. Zudenkova, Galina, 2011. "Cronyism in Business, Public Sector and Politics," MPRA Paper 30231, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Sefa Awaworyi Churchill, 2017. "Fractionalization, entrepreneurship, and the institutional environment for entrepreneurship," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 48(3), pages 577-597, March.
    8. Sefa Awaworyi Churchill & Maria Rebecca Valenzuela & Wisdom Sablah, 2017. "Ethnic diversity and firm performance: Evidence from China’s materials and industrial sectors," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 1711-1731, December.
    9. W. Bentley MacLeod, 2007. "Reputations, Relationships, and Contract Enforcement," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 45(3), pages 595-628, September.
    10. Eren Inci & Simon C. Parker, 2013. "Financing Entrepreneurship and the Old‐Boy Network," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(2), pages 232-258, June.
    11. Kono, Hisaki, 2006. "Employment with connections: Negative network effects," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 244-258, October.
    12. Durlauf, Steven N. & Fafchamps, Marcel, 2005. "Social Capital," Handbook of Economic Growth, in: Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 26, pages 1639-1699 Elsevier.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:41:y:2000:i:4:p:871-91. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing or the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/deupaus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.